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WHY DO FIRMS INVEST IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE? AN 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE MALAYSIAN 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the factors that influence the level of investment in accounts 
receivable in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. We test several theories of the level of 
investment in accounts receivable, using a cross-section of 262 listed manufacturing firms 
over a period of five years (2007-2011). Both fixed and random effect approaches are 
adopted to deal with potential heterogeneity across firms. Our results show that investment 
in accounts receivable in Malaysia are influenced by firm size, short-term finance, sales 
growth, and collateral. Profit, liquidity and gross margins have no role in affecting the 
decision of trade credit granting to customers. Our results are inconsistent with previous 
studies. Size and short-term finance have a negative, rather than positive, impact. Liquidity 
and gross margins have no, rather than positive, effect. While profit and sales growth are 
predicted to feature a U-shaped relationship with investment in accounts receivable, the 
former is insignificant while the latter is strictly increasing. The only factor found to be 
consistent with prior studies is collateral. This has important implications for policy 
makers in Malaysia and may apply to emerging economies.  
 
 
 
Key words: accounts receivable level, trade credit, Malaysian manufacturing sector.  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Accounts receivable occur when suppliers of goods and services sell on credit and thus allow their 
customers to defer payment to a later date. However, this type of credit is granted by firms whose 
primary business is to sell goods and services not provide finance to customers. Sale on credit 
create a current asset, called accounts receivable, in the balance sheet of suppliers. Thus 
investment in accounts receivable is the amounts outstanding payable by customers to their 
suppliers. Given the high volume of sales on credit between businesses, this asset is especially 
high and considered by many as the riskiest in the firm’s balance sheet (Pike and Cheng, 2001; 
Wilson and Summers, 2002; Paul and Boden, 2008). There are many reasons why firms accept 
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delayed payment and invest in this low return asset (see Paul and Boden, 2008 for more detail). 
Although, selling on credit increases sales and often improves customer loyalty, it nevertheless 
increases financial costs and exposes firms to significant risks (delayed payment and default). For 
example, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, credit squeeze was cited as one of the main 
causes of the collapse of many Malaysian firms (Thomas, 2002).  
Various theories have been put forward to explain factors that influence the granting of credit to 
customers. The aim of this paper is to test these theories using a cross section of listed Malaysian 
manufacturing firms. It has been shown that accounts receivable represent a major proportion of 
Malaysian firms’ assets (Paul et al., 2012). Given the risk exposure threatening Malaysian firms, it 
is curious surprising to find that little research has been conducted as to the factors that influence 
Malaysian firms’ decisions to carry high levels of accounts receivable and incur costs related to 
investing in this low return, high risk asset by granting credit to their customers.  
The Malaysian manufacturing sector, which accounts for approximately 30% of the Malaysian 
GDP, is an important part of the economy. The sector suffers from late payment problems as 
shown by Dun and Bradstreet’s Survey ((Infocredit D&B, 2005)
1
. It is likely that the high levels 
of accounts receivable of Malaysian manufacturing firms are due to their being pressured into 
granting credit to customers in order to survive and compete. Moreover, Thomas (2002) reports 
that the Malaysian legal process for debt recovery is tedious, time-consuming and costly and Ge 
and Qiu (2007) find that firms in less developed Asian economies, rely more on borrowing 
through account receivables compared to firms from more developed economies. Given all these 
factors, this paper will shed light on the reasons business-to-business lending, through accounts 
receivable, is widespread in Malaysia and investigate the factors that affect this decision despite 
                                                 
1
 As reported in the Credence by Infocredit, Issue 2, July to Sept 2005. 
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the risk involved. To our knowledge, this is the first study to-date that looks at the factors that 
influence accounts receivable level in the Malaysian manufacturing sector.  
The rest of the paper is organised into five sections. In section 2 we explain, by reference to the 
literature, the factors that incentivise firms to grant loans to their customers through accounts 
receivable level lending and develop a number of hypotheses. In section 3 we explain the 
methodology used in the study and this is followed by section 4 which presents the models used 
for the empirical investigation. In section 5, we discuss the results and finally conclude in section 
6. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
A number of theories have been developed to explain factors that may influence the level of 
accounts receivable (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Pike and Chen, 2002; 
Paul and Boden, 2008, 2011). Some theories emphasise the role of factors such as company size, 
access to internal/external financing, operating profit and sales revenue growth, liquidity and 
collateral (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Paul and Boden, 2008). 
Others have added factors such as industry norms (Wilson, 2008; Paul and Boden, 2011), 
reputation of firm’s auditor (Gul, et al., 2009; Paul et al., 2012) and ownership (Carney and Child, 
2012; Martínez et al., 2007). Empirical support for the relevance of the various extant theories in 
this area can be found in the work of writers such as Petersen and Rajan, (1997), Marotta (2000), 
Pike and Cheng (2002), Soufani and Poutziouris (2002), Levchuk, (2013), Delannay and Weill 
(2004), Rodriguez (2006). However, there is very little empirical evidence on the role of the 
proposed factors in explaining how much firms are prepared to invest in accounts receivable 
within the emerging and developing economies, especially in Asia (Zainudin, 2008; Love and 
Zaidi, 2010). Most of the empirical literature has focused particularly on the US and the UK.  
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In the next subsections we explain the factors put forward in the literature to explain decisions on 
the level of accounts receivable; these include: firm size, access to internal/external financing, 
operating profit, sales revenue growth, price discrimination, liquidity and collateral to secure 
financing; and based on the literature, seven hypotheses are proposed to examine the determinants 
of the scale of accounts receivable in the Malaysian manufacturing sector.  
2.1 Firm Size  
It is argued that firm size plays a major role in determining the scale of accounts receivable. 
Larger firms are perceived to be more creditworthy and to have more capacity to grant credit to 
their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Main and Smith, 1982; Pike and Cheng, 2001; Soufani 
and Poutziouris, 2002). They also have too high a transaction volume to deal with cash sales 
(Summers and Wilson, 2002; Boden and Paul, 2014). In addition, selling on credit allows firms to 
accumulate invoices for payment and reduce their transaction costs and thus this incentivises them 
to invest in accounts receivable (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Main and Smith, 1982; Pike and 
Cheng, 2001; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). Nevertheless, market power theory suggests that 
larger firms tend to have stronger bargaining position in the trading relationship with their 
customers and thus may both be more reluctant to hold considerable amounts of receivables and 
impose stricter conditions for payments (Delannay and Weill, 2004). However, most empirical 
evidence shows that firms’ characteristics such as size play a positive effect on the level of 
accounts receivable (Ng et al., 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson and Summers, 2002; 
Delannay and Weill, 2004; Paul and Wilson, 2006; Boden and Paul, 2014) hence:  
H1: Larger firms are expected to have higher levels of accounts receivable. 
  
2.2 Access to External Short-Term Finance  
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The helping hand theory suggests that firms with higher short-term borrowing capability are more 
likely to use this source of finance to grant business-to-business credit to their customers (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Ge and Qiu, 2007). Such firms tend to have high 
borrowing power, hence better access to funds and thus are expected to be in a position to grant 
credit to their customers that rely heavily on them to finance their working capital needs (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). Wilson (2008) finds that financial strength plays 
a big role in the decision of investing in accounts receivable. In addition, Paul and Wilson (2006) 
and Boden and Paul (2014) report that this situation is often exacerbated by financial crises and 
distress and/or when banks tighten lending. Thus credit from suppliers is offered to substitute 
and/or complement other sources of funds to help valuable customers. In times of recession it is 
found that borrowing, through accounts receivable, becomes a source of finance for the survival 
and growth of firms of all sizes (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). We therefore expect a positive 
relationship between short-term lines of credit and accounts receivable hence:  
H2: Firms with greater access to external short-term financing are expected to have 
higher accounts receivable.  
 
2.3 Access to Internal Short-Term Finance and Profit  
Financial theory posits that profitable firms with sound internal cash-flow generating capability 
tend to grant credit to their customers and thus carry high receivables (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Levchuk, 2013; Ge and Qiu, 2007). Delannay and Weill (2004) find that profitability is positively 
linked with the trade receivables ratio. In the same vein, Ge and Qiu, (2007) show that profitable 
firms are more inclined to grant credit to their customers given their healthy financial situation. 
Page 5 of 90 Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Accounting in Em
erging Econom
ies6 
 
However, applying the distressed
2
 firms’ theory, loss-making firms may extend more credit to 
improve sales and keep themselves afloat (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Summers and Wilson, 
2002), and thus one would expect such firms to grant more credit and hence have higher levels of 
accounts receivable. In addition, Delannay and Weill (2004) and Soufani and Poutziouris, (2002) 
find that certain loss-making firms, by default, tend to exhibit high receivables resulting from 
customers taking advantage of this financial fragility to delay payment. Therefore, we anticipate 
that both higher profitability and higher distress lead to higher accounts receivable. We thus 
propose the following hypothesis:   
H3: Operating profitability has a smile effect on accounts receivable. Specifically, firms 
with greater access to internal financing (higher operating profitability) hold higher levels 
of accounts receivable, while firms in greater distress (negative operating profitability) 
also hold higher levels of accounts receivable.  
Several measures have been used to proxy internal financing that is represented by the cash-flow 
generated from operating profit. Petersen and Rajan (1997), for instance, use net profit after tax 
over turnover while Rodriguez (2006) utilises the operating profit to turnover. In this study, we 
use the latter. 
  
2.4 Sales Revenue Growth  
Firms with sales growth tend to offer more credit to their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Wilson, 2008). Changes in firms’ turnover, from year to year, indicate an increase/decrease in 
their operations and this is represented by changes in firms’ revenues. Given that most business-
to-business transactions are on credit, increases in sales lead to increases in accounts receivable 
                                                 
2
 A firm is defined as being under distress if it has negative sales growth and negative net income (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
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level. Summers and Wilson (2002) find that small/new firms with potential same growth tend to 
have larger investments in receivables, relative to their total assets, as they may invest more in 
accounts receivable to attract new customers. In the same vein, Boden and Paul (2014) find that 
growing firms make relatively higher investments in their receivables as they tend to grant more 
credit to encourage repeated business to finance their growth. Nevertheless, those with declining 
sales may have greater receivables as they use credit granting as a marketing tool to improve their 
sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson, 2008). Many find a positive relationship between sales 
growth and accounts receivable in growing firms which decide to implement aggressive 
commercial strategies to i crease sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). 
In addition, Delannay and Weill (2004) find distressed firms extend more credit to their customers 
to boost depressed sales, sustain revenues and survive. A non-linear link between growth and 
receivables is therefore expected. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: The sales growth has a smile effect on the level of accounts receivable, namely, both 
positive and negative growth in sales lead to higher levels of accounts receivable.  
 
2.5 Collateral to Secure Financing  
Levchuk (2013) and Hammes (2003) posit that higher asset-based firms can offer better collateral 
to obtain external funding that can be used to invest more on accounts receivable by give credit to 
customers constrained by inadequacy of collateral. They use the net fixed assets to total assets 
ratio to represents firms’ ability to secure bank loans. They find that firms with high ratios have a 
greater ability to secure short-term borrowing to extend credit to customers. Similarly, Petersen 
and Rajan (1997) find that when firms have relatively easy access to funds through their 
collateral, they are in a better position to grant credit to their customers. However, they came 
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across some firms with low fixed assets (such as trading firms that have the bulk of their assets in 
current assets) that still extend trade credit in order to compete. Levchuk (2013) uses the ratio of 
net fixed assets to firms’ total assets as a proxy to measure firms’ ability to secure financing. We 
therefore expect collateral to be positively related to trade credit granting, hence:  
H5: Firms with higher net fixed assets to total assets are more likely to extend more credit 
and thus to have higher levels of accounts receivable.  
 
2.6 Liquidity  
Firms that have better access to sources of finance tend to pass on the benefit to their less liquid 
customers by granting them credit (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; 
Delannay and Weill, 2004; Paul et al. 2012). This helping hand theory postulates that cash-rich 
firms are more willing to finance their customers’ inventory to secure repeat business (Paul and 
Boden, 2008). So firms that have a better liquidity position tend to invest in their less liquid 
customers by granting them credit. Nevertheless, Marotta (2000) and Rodriguez (2006) argue that 
firms with a high quick ratio (liquid assets over current liabilities) may have less incentive to 
promote sales via granting credit due to potential overtrading and, thus, are likely to offer less 
credit. However, Levchuk (2013) finds that those with financial disadvantages promote sales 
through investment in low-return financial instruments such as trade credit. The liquidity position 
of firms is proxied by the quick ratio, net of commercial component (Levchuk, 2013; Marotta, 
2000). So a positive relationship is expected between liquidity and accounts receivable, hence:  
H6: Cash-rich firms have high levels of accounts receivables.  
 
2.7 Price Discrimination  
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Firms with high gross profit margins have a greater incentive to finance sales of additional units 
via generous credit terms and hence are expected to have high receivables (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997). They can use different credit terms to price discriminate between their customers (Meltzer, 
1960; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978; Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). For 
instance, they may choose not to enforce the agreed terms and thus allow selected customers to 
pay after the due date; this is the equivalent of price reduction (Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978; 
Paul and Boden, 2008). Such generous credit terms allow suppliers surreptitiously to violate price 
regulation (Emery, 1984). In addition, it is found that those with healthy profit margins can, 
effectively, afford to reduce the product price through the generous credit terms and this often 
leads to additional sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). Such price 
discrimination is frequently used as a strategic tool to maintain customers and, indeed, to attract 
more (Boden and Paul, 2014). So any credit period prolonged beyond the agreed period, without 
penalty, is equivalent to a price reduction (Schwartz, 1974; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978). We 
therefore predict a positive relationship between accounts receivable and firms’ gross profit 
margins. Hence:  
H7: Firms with higher gross margins are expected to have higher levels accounts 
receivable.  
  
3. DATA, METHODS AND VARIABLES  
We use secondary data to test the hypotheses developed in the preceding section. We use listed 
firms on the Main and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia (under the Consumer Products and 
Industrial Products sector) which collectively represent the listed manufacturing firms in 
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Malaysia. The data is obtained from Reuter’s official website
3
using balance sheets and profit and 
loss accounts for the financial years ending 2007-2011, for all listed manufacturing firms. The 
annual reports are obtained from the Bursa Malaysia official website
4
. We follow Petersen and 
Rajan’s (1997) study and adopt a correlational approach to examine the factors that affect the 
level of accounts receivable. A predictive correlational design is used to explore causality and 
factors influencing other variables.  
We use accounts receivable (AR) as a proxy for trade credit extension. However, because of 
potential scale effect problems, we also consider a scaled version of accounts receivables, namely 
accounts receivable to totals assets. We increase the scale of this variable in order to match the 
scale of the dependent variables (which helps reduce the number of decimal places in the 
estimated coefficients, but does not alter the results). Thus, our second dependent variable is 
defined as follows: 
ARTA =

	
		
× 1000 
 
In line with our hypotheses, we use the seven independent variables which have been identified in 
previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Delannay and Weill, 2004; Soufani and Poutziouris, 
2002): company size, access to internal/external financing, operating profit, sales revenue growth, 
price discrimination, liquidity and collateral.  
Finally, to complete our model specification, we consider several control variables. The first is a 
dummy representing the firm’s sector. This variable represents either consumer product or 
industrial product manufacturers (in accordance with Bursa Malaysia’s classification). Prior 
studies such as Angappan and Nasruddin (2003) and Nasruddin (2008) included the sector as a 
                                                 
3
 www.reuters.com/finance 
4
 www.bursamalysia.com 
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control variable. This variable (SECTOR) is used to control for the well-known impact of industry 
sectors and payment customs (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Angappan and Nasruddin, 2003; 
Nasruddin, 2008). Consumer products are more fast-moving than industrial products and mainly 
for consumption whereas industrial products are mainly for capital goods. As a result, commercial 
motives, elasticity of demand, and economies of scale are expected to be different in different 
sectors. Following the Bursa Malaysia classification for the manufacturing sector, the variable 
SECTOR is set equal to 0 for consumer products and 1 for industrial products. Other sectors are 
not included in this study.  
 
The second control variable is the auditor’s reputation (AUDITOR), which identifies whether the 
firm uses one of the Big Four auditing firms in Malaysia. Large firms are expected to have more 
resources and technical expertise and may be more likely to use auditors of the highest reputation 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Janssen et al., 2005; Gul et al., 2009). So we use AUDITOR to control for 
the possibility that firms audited by one of the Big Four extend different levels of trade compared 
to those that use the services of Non-Big Four firms. The variable AUDITOR is set equal to 1 if 
the firm is audited by one of the Big Four and zero otherwise.  
The third variable captures the possible effect of family ownership concentration (20% or more 
family ownership). Malaysia has a high level of family ownership concentration (Claessens, et al., 
2000; Claessens, et al., 2002; Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012) and has one of the highest per capita 
presences of family-owned firms in the world (Claessens et al., 2002; Ismail and Sinnadurai, 
2012; Sinnadurai, 2015). Family owned-firms are more likely to enjoy enhanced earnings quality 
(Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007) and may, therefore, grant more credit to their customers. The 
control for family ownership captures ownership concentration as potential determinants of credit 
granting in the same way as dividend policy (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003; Mitton, 
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2004). We label this variable OWN and set it equal to 1 if 20% or more of the firm’s equity is 
family owned and zero otherwise.  
Finally, the time effect is accounted for by four time dummies (T2007 to T2010), where each 
dummy-year is set equal to one for that particular year and zero otherwise. These four years are 
contrasted with the year 2006.  
Since the data set consists of observations for 262 firms over five consecutive years, the 
estimation should be undertaken within a panel analysis framework. One advantage of a panel 
regression over a simple cross-section regression is that it provides more flexibility when 
modelling differences in behaviour across different firms. These firm-specific effects are 
accounted for in a natural way in panel data models. However, one particular difficulty is whether 
these effects should be treated as fixed or randomly distributed across firms. The fixed effects 
model assumes that the unobserved firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, 
while in the latter case they may be correlated. Fortunately, the choice between the fixed or 
random effects model may be tested empirically through the Hausman test which assesses whether 
the firm-specific factors are correlated with the regressors. Rejection of this hypothesis implies 
that the firm-specific factors should be treated as fixed (deterministic) rather than random. 
 Table 1 provides brief definitions of the above independent variables and relates them to the 
study’s hypotheses. 
Table 1: List of Independent and Control Variables 
Hypothesis Explanatory Variables  Definition  
H1 Company’s size (LOGSIZE)  Log (Book Value of Assets)  
H2 Short-term line of credit 
(STCREDIT)  
Financial Institutions Debts in 
Current Liabilities/Turnover  
H3 Profit and internal cash 
(OPEPROFIT)  
Operating Profit Before Tax 
(OP) /Revenue(REV)  
H4 Sales growth (SGROWTH)  Percentage Sales Growth  
H5 Collateral to secure financing 
(COLLATERAL)  
Net Fixed Assets /Total 
Assets  
H6 Liquidity (LIQUID)  Quick Ratio, i.e. the ratio of 
current assets (excluding 
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inventories) over current 
liabilities  
H7 Gross Margin (GMARGIN)  Gross Profit Margin/Revenue 
 Industry Sector (SECTOR)  Industrial Products = ‘1’, zero 
otherwise. 
 Auditors (AUDITOR) Big Four audit firms = ‘1’, 
zero otherwise. 
 Ownership (OWN)  
 
Family members own 20% or 
more of shareholdings of 
company = ‘1’, zero 
otherwise.  
 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
 
Our data consists of 262 firms over a period of five years (2007-2011). Although a pooled 
time series and cross section regression is possible, the potential heterogeneity across firms 
may bias the results. Both fixed effect and random effect approaches are therefore adopted.  
 
The following simple functional equation is proposed: 
  
 =  +  +  ! + "##$ + %&' 
       											+( + )*+! + ,-. + / + 0+! 
+1&. + 2007 +  2008 + "2009 + %2010 
 
where TCit takes one of the two trade credit proxies defined earlier, for firm i in year t, and 6 is a firm 
specific effect which is assumed either fixed or random depending on the panel data model adopted. 
Out of the 262 publicly listed firms under study, 66% specialise in industrial products (the remainder 
specialising in consumer products). Over half the sample (51.14%) employs one of the Big Four auditing 
firms in Malaysia. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. The 
statistics are summarised across all firm-year observations. A typical Malaysian firm has an average 
accounts receivable of just over 66 million Rm. The large standard deviation of nearly 114 million Rm is 
indicative of large dispersion of trade credit extension in our sample. The most credit offered is more than 
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1.25 billion RM. This extreme figure indicates the potential scale problem stemming from the 
heterogeneity in firm size across the sample. Once we scale accounts receivable by total assets, the 
figures look more reasonable with an average of 16.33% and a maximum of 63.19%. 
Additional calculations reveal that the industrial products firms have longer days outstanding (81.64 days) 
compared to consumer product manufacturers (65.29 days). This is confirmed by the figures on ARTA 
(16.92% for the industry against 15.18% for the non-industry). However, in absolute terms, the AR of the 
two sectors are of similar scale (RM 67.84 million against RM 62.73 million) although the industry sector 
is marginally higher. These results are in line with Angappan and Nasruddin (2003), who find that 
industrial product manufacturers have higher trade credit levels compared with consumer product 
manufacturers.  
The remaining independent variables also show large variability and extreme cases. The short-term credit 
also reflects a substantial diversity within our sample. The average availability of debt (current liabilities) 
relative to turnover is 0.249%. Given a standard deviation of 0.464, which would roughly mean that 95% 
of firms have credit availability of less than 1.2%, this indicates that the majority of firms have little 
access to external funding. Nevertheless, there are a few firms that have much healthier access to credit 
(the maximum being 5.856%).  
The operating profit is negative on average. This is not surprising since our sample coincides with the 
global meltdown of the credit crunch. The growth in sales is about 11% on average, but includes extremes 
on both sides. While some firms’ growth declined by nearly 94%, that of others exploded by more than 
2,254%. The collateral also shows a substantial diversity in our sample. Although the average is around 
3% (with more than 90% of the firms having less than 9% collateral) there are some outliers with 
46.349%. The liquidity is very similar. Finally, the gross margin shows a positive average profitability of 
nearly 18%, but a substantial number of firms witnessed losses (the standard deviation suggesting that 
about 95% of firms had gross margins between roughly -10% and 46%).  
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Pearson’s pairwise correlation matrix is shown in Table 3. As can be seen, the largest correlation is 
between gross margin and operating profit. Although significant at the 1% level, the correlation is well 
below the usual recommended threshold of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2006). The lowest correlation is -0.358 between 
short-term credit and operating profit. Overall, the pairwise correlations between the independent 
variables do not suggest that multicollinearity is an issue. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of the Main Dependent and Independent Variables 
Series  Mean  Std. Error  Minimum  Maximum  
AR (million Rm)  66.107  113.996  0.000  1254.185  
ARTA (%)  16.329  9.831  0.000  63.189  
LOGSIZE (log Million Rm)  5.483  1.177  3.131  10.171  
STCREDIT (%)  0.249  0.464  0.000  5.856  
OPEPROFIT (million Rm)  -0.376  41.465  -873.564  270.306  
SGROWTH (%)  11.058  84.887  -93.987  2254.707  
COLLATERAL (%)  3.057  3.241  0.000  41.989  
LIQUID (%)  2.635  2.987  0.105  46.349  
GMARGIN (%)  17.912  13.977  -71.227  86.280  
 
Table 3. Pairwise Correlations of the Main Independent Variables 
 LOGSIZE  STCREDIT  OPEPROFIT  SGROWTH  COLLATERAL  LIQUID 
CREDIT -0.037   
   
OPERPROFIT 0.143** -0.358**   
  
SGROWTH 0.049 -0.070* 0.091**   
 
COLLATERAL 0.080** -0.174** 0.104** 0.068*   
LIQUID -0.087** -0.240** 0.100** -0.034 -0.023  
GMARGIN 0.113** -0.168** 0.378** 0.060 -0.008 0.103** 
 ** significant at the 1% level. * significant at the 5% level. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Table 4 presents the results for the random and fixed effect models for the two dependent variables. In 
both cases the Hausman specification test are highly significant and suggest that the fixed effect models 
are more appropriate. The coefficients for the sector (SEC) and ownership (OWN) dummies are not 
estimated under the fixed specification since the fixed effect model wipes out time invariant variables 
(including the intercept). We will therefore rely on the random effect estimates of these dummy variables 
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while for the remaining coefficients we use the fixed effect estimates.  
The two fixed effect models explain a significant portion of the variability of the trade credit measures. 
The R-squares are 86.9% and 84.6% for AR and ARTA respectively, whereas both F-statistics are highly 
significant, suggesting that the overall fit is statistically significant. Although the fit is very good in both 
cases, the relative (ARTA) and absolute (AR) measures of trade credit do not coincide. The level of trade 
credit (AR) is explained almost exclusively by size. In the AR model, the coefficient associated with 
LOGSIZE is highly significant and positive, suggesting that larger firms grant more trade credit. This 
result could have two explanations. One obvious, but less likely, explanation is that only size matters for 
trade credit. If we were to accept this explanation, then only the first hypothesis can be confirmed. 
However, a more reasonable explanation is that these results are likely to be due to the scale effect. In 
other words, the results are driven by the fact that some firms are larger than others. Since larger firms 
have relatively larger sales, accounts receivable are naturally greater for larger firms. This effect could be 
so important that the other explanations such as collateral or liquidity are dwarfed and rendered 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that AR is not an appropriate measure for trade credit since the 
scale effect dominates and obscures other variables. The only other significant variable for the AR model 
is sales growth.  
The model for the relative measure, ARTA, shows a more reasonable outcome, albeit with a marginally 
lower coefficient of determination. Given the lower R-squares, it is clear that size does not dominate the 
other variables. More importantly, size has a negative effect on trade credit (larger firms extend less trade 
credit relative to their size). The coefficient of log-size is -14.36, and suggests that an increase from the 
average firm size of 244 million Rm (5.48 log-million Rm) to 665 million RM (6.46 log-million RM) 
reduces the trade credit by slightly more than 14%.  
Short-term credit is highly significant and suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in short-term 
external finance leads to a decrease in trade credit of around 13%.  
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Sales growth is modelled with a quadratic term in order to capture non-linearity. Our two sub-hypotheses 
H4a and H4b state that both increasing growth and decreasing growth lead to higher trade credit (smile 
pattern). This can be captured by the linear (SGROWTH) and quadratic (SGROWTH2) terms. The smile 
pattern would be indicated by a negative linear coefficient and a positive quadratic coefficient. The results 
suggest the opposite of the smile pattern, since the linear term is positive (=0.211) and significant while 
the quadratic coefficient is negative (=-0.0001) and significant. This means that a decrease in sales always 
decreases trade credit. At the same time, increasing sales always leads to increases trade credit, albeit at a 
decreasing rate. 
 Collateral is highly significant and has a positive coefficient, suggesting that a one percentage point 
increase in collateral increases trade credit by 3.56%.  
The remaining variables, namely operating profit (H3) and liquidity (H6), and gross margin (H7) are 
insignificant.  
The control variables have a mixed effect. The sector, auditor and ownership dummies are insignificant 
(as suggested by the random effect model). The second group of the control variables are the time 
dummies related to the crisis period. The 2007 dummy is insignificant, meaning that there was no 
difference in trade credit between 2006 and 2007. This is expected as the year 2007 was the beginning the 
latest credit crunch whereas ARTA is a stock variable that cumulates over one or more years. However, 
the crisis was clearly felt a year later, starting from 2008. Indeed, the dummies for 2008, 2009 and 2010 
are all highly significant and negative. Thus, the crisis reduced the average relative trade credit, probably 
as a result of financial difficulties, and the increased default risk faced by suppliers. 
Table 4. Fixed and Random Effect Panel Data Estimation Results 
 Fixed Effect                  Random Effect  
  AR ARTA AR ARTA 
 coeff p-val coeff p-val Coeff p-val coeff p-val 
Intercept  
 
    -252.802  0.000  274.935  0.000  
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Notes: The dependent variable is the accounts receivables over total revenue reported by the firms extracted from www.reuters.com/finance/stocks. 
The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the reported t-statistics are White-   adjusted values to control for heteroscedasticity. 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our results are summarised on Table 5. One important result   in this paper relates to the involvement of 
size in both the definition of and impact on trade credit. If we defined trade credit in level terms as 
accounts receivable, then size is not only positively related to trade credit, but also virtually the only 
variable that matters. We argue that this scale effect should be controlled for, since large firms naturally 
grant more trade credit on average. Controlling for the scale effect through the use of accounts receivable 
to total assets (ARTA) reveals interesting insights.  
First, contrary to expectation, our results show that larger Malaysian manufacturing firms grant less trade 
credit. Nevertheless, this result is in line with Soufani and Poutziouris (2002) and Delannay and Weill 
(2004) who argue that under market power theory, larger firms have a better bargaining position in the 
LOGSIZE  29.782  0.000  -14.360  0.028  59.228  0.000  -21.214  0.000  
STCREDIT  -0.935  0.832  -13.124  0.001  -4.133  0.328  -13.885  0.000  
OPEPROFIT  -0.014  0.833  0.112  0.078  -0.049  0.466  0.113  0.069  
OPEPROFIT2  -0.0001  0.853  0.0001  0.234  0.000  0.493  0.000  0.263  
SGROWTH  0.105  0.013  0.211  0.000  0.089  0.031  0.204  0.000  
SGROWTH2  -0.0001  0.029  -0.0001  0.000  0.000  0.048  0.000  0.000  
COLLATERAL  0.073  0.945  3.562  0.000  0.561  0.534  5.168  0.000  
LIQUID  0.382  0.613  -0.860  0.220  0.362  0.608  -1.538  0.021  
GMARGIN  -0.172  0.468  -0.298  0.175  -0.390  0.065  -0.271  0.183  
SEC     -1.307  0.903  19.570  0.113  
AUDITOR     8.465  0.403  4.694  0.680  
OWN     2.708  0.790  -9.963  0.393  
T2007  -2.254  0.584  0.971  0.800  -4.534  0.264  0.261  0.945  
T2008  -2.136  0.612  -10.289  0.009  -5.712  0.164  -11.271  0.003  
T2009  -7.105  0.097  -19.565  0.000  -11.178  0.007  -20.068  0.000  
T2010  -3.261  0.439  -22.331  0.000  -7.543  0.065  -22.809  0.000  
2 0.869 0.846     
Regression F  24.965 20.686     
p-val (F) 0.000 0.000      
Log Likelihood  -7204.54 -7159.16 
Hausman Test 31.609 35.187 
p-val 0.001 0.000 
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trading relationship and, as such, may not need to use trade credit to sell their goods/services. In fact, 
given their bargaining power, larger firm are capable of imposing stricter conditions for payments and 
thus may capitalise on their position to reduce the costs associated with holding considerable amounts of 
receivables. In addition, Smith (1987) and Paul and Boden (2008) argue that larger firms tend to have a 
good reputation, and tend to grant less trade credit to their customers who do not need extended time to 
inspect the quality of the products. However, as we reported in the literature review section, the majority 
of existing empirical work has shown a positive relationship between size and trade credit. Although the 
result could be partly sensitive to methodological issues (we would have confirmed a positive relationship 
under an accounts receivable definition), it could also be specific to Malaysia. Malaysian manufacturing 
firms may be more efficient at collecting debt, or may simply have more market power compared with 
their counterparts in the industrialised economies. Overall, we find insufficient evidence in our sample of 
firms to confirm our first hypothesis. 
Second, the results show that firms in our sample that have access to short-term finance are less likely to 
grant trade credit. This suggests that the helping-hand theory does not hold as far as the Malaysian 
manufacturing firms are concerned: firm that have better access to short-term finance in Malaysia do not 
use trade credit to pass on the benefit to their customers by granting them trade credit. Our second 
hypothesis is therefore rejected.  
Operating profit is found to play no significant role in determining trade credit. While our third 
hypothesis predicted a smile effect (a negative linear coefficient and a positive quadratic coefficient), the 
result show that the two coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance. Thus, we conclude that whether a firm is more or less profitable has no consequence on 
trade credit granting; the third hypothesis is therefore rejected.  
Our fourth hypothesis, suggesting the change in sales has a smile effect, is also rejected. Our results show 
that when sales increase, the level of trade credit granted increases with them. On the other hand, when 
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sales decrease, trade credit decreases with them but at an increasing rate. This is clearly contrary to prior 
fi dings which argue that when the level of sales decreases, firms use trade credit to increase their sales 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Delannay, 2004; Wilson, 2008).  
Collateral is positively correlated with the level of accounts receivable in Malaysian manufacturing firms. 
It seems to play a significant role in the decision of accounts receivable level, implying that those with 
higher tangibility can collateralise their assets to obtain external financing to fund their working capital, 
inter alia, passing on the benefit to their customers by extending them credit though accounts receivable. 
This finding is consistent with Levchuk (2013), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Boden and Paul (2014). 
Our fifth hypothesis is, therefore, the only one we could confirm for Malaysian manufacturing firms. 
Finally, we found no evidence to support the remaining hypotheses, Liquidity (H6) and gross margin 
(H7) both being statistically insignificant.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Investment in accounts receivable, in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, is impacted by many of the 
factors implied by either theory or empirical evidence. However, our main finding in this paper is that the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector is rather different. First, while liquidity and gross margin have been 
found to have a positive and significant effect on accounts receivable helping-hand theory in prior studies, 
our results show that these two factors play no role in influencing the level of accounts receivable in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector. Second, operating profit was expected to have a U-shape effect based on 
prior findings. This too is not supported by our results, which suggest that operating profit has no role in 
determining the scale of accounts receivable. Third, while size, short-term credit and sales growth have 
been found to be significant, they are nevertheless inconsistent with the expected direction of relationship. 
Both size and short-term credit were expected to play a positive role, but were found to have a negative 
effect instead. Note, however, that size does have a positive effect on accounts receivable, which is an 
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absolute measure of trade credit. However, we argue that accounts receivable are naturally linked to firm 
size and should be descaled in order to provide a more relevant measure of trade credit. The only variable 
that is consistent with prior studies is collateral. This factor was found to have a positive effect as 
expected. That collateral is positively associated with trade credit is the only hypothesis confirmed by this 
study.  
Our results have two principal implications. First, policy makers should not take a holistic view of the 
trade credit market. Given that policy makers aim to improve liquidity and trade they should design 
policies that are not only country specific but also sector specific. As is clear from our results, what holds 
for other countries or sectors may not necessarily be true for the Malaysian manufacturing sector. For 
example, if size is positively linked to trade credit, then government policy (via some incentive scheme, 
for example) should target smaller firms because they offer less trade credit. On the other hand, in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector, the policy should be directed towards larger firms. Second, trade credit 
research is highly sensitive to the definition of trade credit. Results, therefore, depend primarily on the 
proxy the researcher uses for trade credit. We find clear evidence that the use of accounts receivable is 
likely to distort findings and affect the validity of empirical results. 
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Table 5: Summary Results of Factors Influencing Accounts Receivable in the Malaysian Manufacturing Sector 
 
No. 
 
Hypothesis 
t-statistics 
(‘+’= positive, 
‘-’ = negative) 
 
Expected 
Results 
 
Results  
Obtained 
 
Comments 
 
H1 
Company’s Size (SIZE) 
Larger firms will grant more trade credit to their customers if the financing and helping 
hand theories hold true and under market power theory, the opposite is true if larger firms 
grant less trade credit. 
 
_ 
 
+ 
 
Significant*** 
 
Large firms will grant less trade 
credit (Market power theory 
supported) 
 
H2 
Short-term Line of Credit   (STCREDIT) 
Firms with greater access to external short-term financing will grant more trade credit, if 
financing and helping hand theories hold true. 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Not Significant 
 
Financing and helping hand 
theories not supported 
 
H3a 
Profit and Internal Cash (OPEPROFIT) 
Firms with greater access to internal financing (higher operating profitability) will extend 
more trade credit, if the financing and helping hand theory hold true. 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
Not Significant 
 
Financing and helping hand 
theories not supported 
H3b Contrary to the financing and helping hand theories, firms in distress (negative operating 
profitability) will also extend more trade credit to survive. 
_ _ Not Significant Not supported 
 
 
H4a 
Sales Growth (GROWTH) 
Firms that have positive sales growth will extend more credit, if the commercial motive 
holds true. 
 
_ 
 
+ 
 
Not Significant 
 
Not supported 
H4b Contrary to the commercial motive, distressed/loss-making firms offer more trade credit 
despite negative sales growth for business survival. 
_ _ Not Significant Not supported 
 
H5 
Collateral to secure financing (COLLATERAL) 
Firms with higher collateral (net fixed assets to total assets) have better ability to secure 
external borrowings to extend trade credit (financing and helping hand theory) and the 
opposite is true under the market power theory. 
 
_ 
 
+ 
 
Significant*** 
 
Market power theory supported. 
Financing and helping hand 
theories not supported. 
 
H6 
Liquidity (LIQUID) 
Firms with high liquidity have less incentive to promote sales via trade credit if the 
market power theory holds true and under the financial and helping hand theories. 
 the opposite is true if firms with higher liquidity extend more trade credit. 
 
_ 
 
_ 
 
Significant** 
 
Market power theory supported. 
Financing and helping hand 
theories not supported 
H7 Incentive to Price Discriminate - Gross Margin (GROSS) 
Firms with higher gross margin extend more credit, if the price discrimination theory 
holds true. 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
Significant*/** 
(Model 1* and  
Model 2**) 
 
Price discrimination theory 
supported.  
Note: Unless specified, the results are for all the two models, Model 1 – the basic model, Model 2 – the extended model of significance ***, **, * at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
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WHY DO FIRMS INVEST IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE? 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE MALAYSIAN 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that influence Malaysian 
manufacturing sector investment in accounts receivable, an asset seen by many 
as one of the riskiest in any company’s balance sheet. We test several theories, 
related to accounts receivable, using a cross-section of 262 listed manufacturing 
firms over a period of five years (2007-2011). Both fixed and random effect 
approaches are adopted to deal with potential heterogeneity across firms. Our 
results show that the absolute level of accounts receivable is almost exclusively 
explained by size. However, the ratio of accounts receivable to assets is 
influenced by firm size, short-term finance, sales growth, and collateral. Profit, 
liquidity and gross margin have no role in affecting the decision to grant trade 
credit to customers. Our results are mostly inconsistent with previous studies. Size 
and short-term finance have a negative, rather than positive, impact. Liquidity and 
gross margin have no, rather than a positive, effect. Profit and sales growth are 
expected to exhibit a U-shaped relationship with investment in accounts 
receivable. We found that the former is insignificant while the latter is strictly 
increasing. The only factor found to be consistent with prior studies, in developed 
counties, is collateral. Our findings may have important implications for policy 
makers in Malaysia and other emerging economies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Accounts receivable (AR) occur when suppliers of goods and services1 sell on credit and 
thus allow their customers to defer payment to a later date. This type of credit is granted 
by firms whose primary business is to sell goods, rather than to provide finance to 
customers. Sale on credit creates AR, a current asset in the balance sheet of suppliers. 
Thus, AR are the amounts outstanding payable by customers to their suppliers. Given the 
high volume of sales on credit between businesses, AR are especially high and are 
considered by many as the riskiest asset in a firm’s balance sheet (Pike and Cheng, 2001; 
Wilson and Summers, 2002; Boden and Paul, 2014).  
There has been sustained interest in managing the level of AR from both academics and 
practitioners, each emphasising the permanent character of this short-term but 
continuously renewed investment and its strategic potential due to the existence of 
financial, tax-based, operating, transaction and pricing motives (Asselbergh, 1999). 
Increasingly, the focus has shifted to the efficiency of AR management and its 
relationship with profitability, in both developing and developed countries (see, for 
example, the studies of Michalski (2012)2 in Poland; Raheman, and Nasr (2007) in 
Pakistan; Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2010) in the USA; and Singh, Kumar, and Colombage 
(2017) in India). However, whilst there is ample evidence as to why companies in 
developed countries continue to invest in AR, it is not clear whether firms within the 
developing world have a similar experience.  
This brings us to the important question of why firms in Malaysia invest in this risky 
asset. Previous research from developed economies has evidenced a variety of reasons as 
to why firms accept delayed payment and invest in this low-return, high-risk asset (Paul 
and Boden, 2008). Specifically, although selling on credit increases sales and often 
improves customer loyalty, it nevertheless increases financial costs and exposes firms to 
significant risks associated with delayed payment and default. The increased risk 
involved with trade credit may be particularly relevant to Malaysia. Indeed, during the 
                                                 
1 Henceforth, we shall use goods to mean goods and or services. 
2 G Michalski - 2012 Efficiency of accounts receivable management in Polish institutions- 
papers.ssrn.com 
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1997 Asian financial crisis, a credit squeeze was cited as one of the main causes of the 
collapse of many Malaysian firms (Thomas, 2002). Clearly, there is a lot at stake, and the 
risk exposure related to AR in Malaysian firms may well exceed the levels experienced 
in the developed world. Thus, given the risk exposure threatening Malaysian firms, it is 
surprising to find that little research has been conducted as to the factors that influence 
their decision of such firms to carry high levels of AR and so incur costs related to 
investing in this low-return/high-risk asset.  
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical work has been dedicated to developed 
economies, especially the US and the UK. These studies suggested a multitude of 
potential factors that influence AR. However, very little research has been carried out on 
Malaysia. Our aim is to fill this gap in the literature by extending our knowledge of AR 
in one emerging economy and potentially drawing lessons for other such economies and 
developing countries. Specifically, our aim is to test on a cross section of Malaysian 
manufacturing firms, the various theories developed within industrialised economies. 
This will shed light on the various reasons that Malaysian businesses invest in AR and 
assess the relevance of various factors affecting the decision to grant trade credit. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that looks at the factors that influence AR levels in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, the Malaysian manufacturing sector accounts for approximately 30% of 
Malaysian GDP. However, the sector suffers from late payment problems (Infocredit 
D&B, 2005).3 High levels of AR are often imposed on companies that are pressured into 
granting credit to customers in order to survive and compete (Paul et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the Malaysian legal process for debt recovery is tedious, time-consuming and 
costly (Thomas, 2002). Ge and Qiu (2007) find that firms in less developed Asian 
economies rely more on business-to-business borrowing compared to firms from more 
developed economies.  
Whilst banks and financial companies are bracing themselves to deal with the 
implementation of IFRS 9, effective from 1st January 2018, we expect the attention of 
non-financial companies to be directed towards managing their AR. Receivables 
management is an important tool for the elimination of credit losses and constitutes an 
essential part of the financial management of each company. Thus, understanding the 
                                                 
3 As reported in the Credence by Infocredit, Issue 2, July to Sept 2005. 
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determinants of credit extension is critical. Our paper contributes to the existing literature 
on trade receivables management from an emerging economy perspective. It serves to 
bring focus to a topic that is almost ignored in most emerging economies but which will 
gain prominence with the implementation of IFRS 9. 
The rest of the paper is organised into five sections. In section 2, we explain, by reference 
to the literature, the factors that incentivise firms to grant loans to their customers through 
AR and develop a number of hypotheses. In section 3, we explain the methodology used 
in the study and this is followed by a presentation of the models used for the empirical 
investigation in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results, and then sets out the 
conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Trade credit is a practice as old as trade itself. At its heart lies the precept that customers 
will honour their commitment to make payment at the agreed time. Sellers agree to a time 
lapse between the delivery of goods and the payment for them. These deliveries are 
recorded as AR. However, although AR may help boost sales, payment delays or even 
defaults may and do occur. As such, AR also creates potential costs that can exceed the 
benefits gained by selling on credit. This two-sided contingency makes investing in AR 
a complex decision for businesses and an interesting phenomenon to academics. 
However, despite potential losses, evidence from markets around the world shows that 
most business-to-business transactions are undertaken on credit, often resulting in high 
levels of AR (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Kling et al., 2014). Trade credit is very 
important; it is greater in volume than the flows of short-term bank borrowing in nearly 
all developing and industrialised countries (Guido 2003; Blasio, 2003). In the UK, for 
instance, AR stand at around 37% of total business assets (Paul and Wilson, 2006, 2007). 
In both the UK and the USA, trade credit exceeds the primary money supply by a factor 
of about 1.5. Trade credit is considered one of the most important forms of finance, 
exceeding the short-term business lending of the entire banking system (Lee and Stowe, 
1993; Ng et al., 1999; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Aaronson et al., 2004; Boden and 
Paul, 2014). Kling et al. (2014) examine the link between trade and short term bank credit 
and provide evidence that they are complementary, a finding that was also supported by 
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both Bias and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). Trade credit is therefore 
an important source of trade liquidity, as well as a useful source of money supply.  
At the micro level, trade credit is seen by firms as an essential marketing tool that helps 
their competitiveness and growth (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Ai-guo (2006) finds that 
firms invest in AR to reinforce their market position, making them more competitive, 
increasing their sales and reducing their inventories. Kling et al. (2014) find that UK firms 
have had to invest in AR to maintain sales and remain competitive.  
Trade credit is also an essential part of working capital; the level of AR has a direct impact 
on other elements of firms’ working capital, such as cash flow and inventory holding. 
Michalski (2012) reports that any change in the level of AR affects the level of working 
capital. It is often argued that cash volatility, for instance, affects the AR level and that 
firms with limited access to external funds invest less in AR (Summers and Wilson, 
2002). In the same vein, firms with higher cash-flow volatility tend to hold higher levels 
of cash and hence to invest less in AR by reducing the level of credit granted to their 
customers (Molina and Preve, 2009; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). Choi and Kim (2003) 
find that firms tend to increase their AR level when the level of their inventories rises.  
Others argue that investing in AR is a way of channelling funds from cash rich firms to 
their financially constrained customers (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Levchuk, 2013) with the aim of enhancing long-term 
relationships. Others still report a positive relationship between the level of AR and the 
increase in shareholder wealth (Hill, et al., 2013). Nevertheless, too high a level of AR 
can be associated with lower profitability (Padachi, 2006) as sellers are effectively 
financing their customers’ inventory for an agreed period into the future, and granting 
credit entails substantial costs as well as risks. If AR can increase both the cost of credit 
and the risk of default, it begs the question as to why companies invest in this asset at all. 
Rationally, the risks of investing in AR should be outweighed by the benefits discussed 
above (Paul and Boden, 2008; Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Some have argued that the 
benefits result from a reduction in transaction costs: selling on credit allows firms to 
accumulate invoices for payment and reduce their transaction costs and this may 
incentivise them to invest more in AR (Main and Smith, 1982; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Pike and Cheng, 2001; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). Others have emphasised the 
benefits gained from building customer relationship to help repeat business and thus gain 
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competitive advantage (Jacob, 1994; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Fisman and Raturi, 
2004; Cuñat, 2007; Burkart et al., 2011). Other still looked at the helping hand theory 
where, through trade credit, funds are channelling from cash-rich firms to those with 
limited borrowing power in the supply chain (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Pike and Cheng, 
2001; Atansova and Wilson, 2003). This process facilitates financial efficiency across 
supply chains between suppliers and customers (Hoffman and Kotzab, 2010). It is also 
argued that the benefits come from better communication between buyers and sellers 
(Jain, 2001; Wilson, 2008; Boden and Paul 2014).  Investment in AR leads to mitigating 
the asymmetry of information for both parties. Buyers have time to inspect the quality of 
the goods before payment, and sellers to collect important information about the buyers’ 
financial health through risk assessment before granting credit. Therefore, in the process 
of granting credit, buyers and sellers gain vital information about each other. The 
warranty of product quality reduces the risk of late payment and default, whereas the 
information collected in the process can be used effectively to assess the creditworthiness 
of customers before further credit is granted. This can speed up the return on AR.  
A number of theories have been developed to explain the factors influencing the level of 
AR (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Pike and Chen, 2002; Paul 
and Boden, 2008, 2011; Boden and Paul, 2014). Some theories emphasise the role of 
factors such as company size, access to internal/external financing, operating profit and 
sales revenue growth, liquidity and collateral (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and 
Poutziouris, 2002; Paul and Boden, 2008). Others have added factors such as industry 
norms (Wilson, 2008; Paul and Boden, 2011), the reputation of the firm’s auditor (Gul, 
et al., 2009; Paul et al., 2012) and ownership (Martínez et al., 2007; Carney and Child, 
2012). Empirical support for the relevance of the various extant theories in this area can 
be found in the work of, for example, Petersen and Rajan, (1997), Marotta (2000), Pike 
and Cheng (2002), Soufani and Poutziouris (2002), Levchuk, (2013), Delannay and Weill 
(2004), Rodriguez (2006). However, there is very little empirical evidence on the role of 
the proposed factors in explaining how much firms are prepared to invest in AR within 
emerging and developing economies, especially in Asia (Zainudin, 2008; Love and Zaidi, 
2010). Most of the empirical literature has focused particularly on the US and the UK.  
In the next subsections, we describe the factors put forward in the literature to explain 
decisions on the level of AR and these include: firm size, access to internal/external 
financing, operating profit, sales revenue growth, price discrimination, liquidity and 
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collateral to secure financing. Based on the literature, seven hypotheses are proposed to 
examine the determinants of the scale of AR in the Malaysian manufacturing sector.  
 
2.1. Firm Size  
It is argued that firm size plays a major role in determining the scale of AR. Larger firms 
are perceived to be more creditworthy and to have a higher capacity for greater 
investment in AR by granting more credit to their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Main and Smith, 1982; Pike and Cheng, 2001; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). They also 
have too high a transaction volume to deal with cash sales and may already hold high AR 
levels (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Boden and Paul, 2014). Nevertheless, market power 
theory suggests that larger firms tend to have a stronger bargaining position in the trading 
relationship with their customers and, thus, may not need to hold considerable amounts 
of AR. Consequently, they impose stricter conditions for payments (Delannay and Weill, 
2004). However, most empirical evidence shows that characteristics such as firm size do 
play a positive effect on the level of AR (Ng et al., 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Wilson and Summers, 2002; Delannay and Weill, 2004; Paul and Wilson, 2006; Boden 
and Paul, 2014). Hence:  
H1: Larger firms tend to invest more in AR.  
 2.2. Access to External Short-Term Finance  
Financial strength plays a major role in the decision to invest in AR (Wilson, 2008) Thus 
firms with borrowing capability are more likely to invest in AR by granting  more credit 
to their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Ge and Qiu, 
2007). Such firms tend to have high borrowing power, and are thus expected to invest 
more in AR, so helping those customers which rely heavily on them to finance their 
working capital needs (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). Thus, 
credit from suppliers is offered to complement, and/or substitute for, other sources of 
funds to help valuable customers. Furthermore, lack of finance is often exacerbated by 
financial crises and, when banks tighten lending, so trade borrowing becomes a source of 
finance for the survival and growth of firms of all sizes (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). 
We therefore expect a positive relationship between short-term lines of credit and AR:  
H2: Firms with greater access to external short-term financing are expected to 
invest more in AR.  
2.3 Access to Internal Short-Term Finance and Profit  
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Financial theory posits that profitable firms with sound internal cash-flow generating 
capability tend to grant credit to their customers and thus carry high AR levels (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Levchuk, 2013). Delannay and Weill (2004) find 
that profitability is positively linked with the AR ratio. In the same vein, Ge and Qiu, 
(2007) show that, given their healthy financial situation, profitable firms are more 
inclined to grant credit to their customers. However, applying the distressed4 firms’ 
theory, loss-making firms may extend more credit to improve sales and keep themselves 
afloat (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Summers and Wilson, 2002).  Thus, one would expect 
such firms to grant more credit and hence have higher levels of AR. In addition, Delannay 
and Weill (2004) and Soufani and Poutziouris, (2002) find that certain loss-making firms, 
by default, tend to exhibit high AR resulting from customers taking advantage of this 
financial fragility to delay payment. Therefore, we anticipate that both higher profitability 
and higher distress lead to higher AR. We thus propose the following hypothesis:   
H3: Operating profitability has a smile effect on AR.  Specifically, firms with 
greater access to internal financing (higher operating profitability) invest in 
higher levels of AR, while firms in greater distress (negative operating 
profitability) also invest in higher levels of AR.  
Several measures have been used to proxy internal financing represented by the cash flow 
generated from operating profit. Petersen and Rajan (1997), for instance, use net profit 
after tax over turnover while Rodriguez (2006) utilises the operating profit to turnover. 
In this study, we use the latter. 
 2.4. Sales Revenue Growth  
Given that most transactions are on credit, increases in sales lead to increases in the AR 
level. Thus, firms with sales growth may offer more credit to their customers and hence 
invest more in AR (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson, 2008). It is argued that small/new 
firms with potential for growth tend to have larger investments in AR, relative to their 
total assets, as they are inclined to grant more credit to encourage repeated business to 
finance further growth (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Boden and Paul, 2014). 
Nevertheless, those with declining sales may have greater AR as they use trade credit as 
a marketing tool to improve their sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson, 2008). Many 
find a positive relationship between sales growth and AR in expanding firms, which 
                                                 
4 A firm is defined as being under distress if it has negative sales growth and negative net income (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
 
Page 33 of 90 Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Accounting in Em
erging Econom
ies
10 
 
decide to implement aggressive commercial strategies to increase sales (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). In addition, distressed firms extend more 
credit to boost depressed sales in a bid to survive (Delannay and Weill, 2004). A non-
linear link between growth and AR is therefore expected. Hence, we propose the 
following hypothesis:  
H4: Sales growth has a smile effect on the level of AR, namely, both small 
(negative) and big growth in sales lead to higher levels of AR.  
2.5. Collateral to Secure Financing  
Levchuk (2013) and Hammes (2003) posit that higher asset based firms can offer better 
collateral to obtain external funding that can then be used to invest in more AR by 
granting credit to c stomers constrained by inadequacy of collateral. They use the net 
fixed assets to total assets ratio to represents firms’ ability to secure bank loans and find 
that firms with high ratios have a greater ability to secure short-term borrowing to invest 
in AR. Similarly, Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that when firms have relatively easy 
access to funds through their collateral, they tend to have high levels of AR. However, 
they came across some firms with low fixed assets (such as trading firms, the bulk of 
whose assets are current assets) that still grant trade credit in order to compete. Levchuk 
(2013) uses firms’ net fixed assets to total assets ratio as a proxy to measure their ability 
to secure financing. We therefore expect collateral to be positively related to the level of 
AR, hence:  
H5: Firms with higher net fixed assets to total assets are more likely to grant 
credit and thus to invest in higher levels of AR.  
2.6. Liquidity  
Firms with healthy liquidity tend to hold high AR levels (Summers and Wilson, 2002; 
Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Delannay and Weill, 2004; and Paul et al. 2012). They 
are more willing to finance their customers’ inventory to secure repeat business (Paul and 
Boden, 2008). Thus those with greater liquidity tend to invest in their less liquid 
customers by granting them credit. Nevertheless, Marotta (2000) and Rodriguez (2006) 
argue that firms with a high quick ratio (liquid assets over current liabilities) may have 
less incentive to promote sales through granting credit due to potential overtrading and, 
thus, are likely to offer less credit. However, Levchuk (2013) finds that those with 
financial disadvantages promote sales through investment in low-return financial 
instruments such as AR. The liquidity position of firms is proxied by the quick ratio, net 
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of commercial components (Levchuk, 2013; Marotta, 2000) and so a positive relationship 
is expected between liquidity and the level of AR, hence:  
H6: Cash-rich firms invest in higher levels of AR.  
2.7. Price Discrimination  
Firms with high gross profit margins have a greater incentive to finance sales of additional 
units via generous credit terms and hence are expected to have a high level of AR 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). They can use different credit terms to price discriminate 
between their customers (Meltzer, 1960; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978; Mian and 
Smith, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). For instance, they may choose not to enforce the 
agreed terms and thus allow selected customers to pay after the due date; this is the 
equivalent of a price reduction (Schwartz, 1974; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978; Paul and 
Boden, 2008). Such ge erous credit terms allow suppliers surreptitiously to violate price 
regulation (Emery, 1984). In addition, those with healthy profit margins can, effectively, 
afford to reduce the product price through the generous credit terms and this often leads 
to additional sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). We 
therefore predict a positive relationship between the level of AR and firms’ gross profit 
margins, hence:  
H7: Firms with higher gross margins are expected to have higher levels AR.  
3. DATA, METHOD AND VARIABLES  
Secondary data is used to test the hypotheses developed in the preceding section. We use 
the firms listed on the Main and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia (under the Consumer 
Products and Industrial Products sector), collectively representing all listed 
manufacturing firms in Malaysia. The data is obtained from Reuter’s official website5 
using balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for the financial years ending 2007 to 
2011 (inclusive). This data is then complemented by annual reports, obtained from the 
Bursa Malaysia official website.6 We follow Petersen and Rajan’s (1997) study and adopt 
a correlational approach to examine the factors that affect the level of AR. A predictive 
correlational design is used to explore causality and factors influencing other variables. 
                                                 
5 www.reuters.com/finance 
6 www.bursamalysia.com 
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 We use AR as a proxy for the granting of trade credit. However, because of potential 
scale effect problems, we also consider a scaled version of AR, namely AR to totals assets 
(AR/TA). We increase the scale of this variable in order to match the scale of the 
dependent variables (which helps reduce the number of decimal places in the estimated 
coefficients, but does not alter the results). Thus, our second dependent variable is defined 
as follows: 
ARTA =
𝐴𝑅
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
× 1000 
 
In line with our hypotheses, we use seven independent variables, which have been 
identified in previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; 
Delannay and Weill, 2004): company size, access to internal/external financing, 
operating profit, sales revenue growth, price discrimination, liquidity and collateral.  
Finally, to complete our model specification, we consider several control variables. The 
first is a dummy representing the firm’s sector. This variable represents either consumer 
product or industrial product manufacturers (in accordance with Bursa Malaysia’s 
classification). Prior studies such as Angappan and Nasruddin (2003) and Nasruddin 
(2008) included the sector as a control variable. SECTOR is used to control for the well-
known impact of industry sectors and payment customs (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Angappan and Nasruddin, 2003; Nasruddin, 2008). Consumer products are more fast-
moving than industrial products and mainly for consumption whereas industrial products 
are mainly for capital goods. As a result, commercial motives, elasticity of demand, and 
economies of scale are expected to be different in different sectors. Following the Bursa 
Malaysia classification for the manufacturing sector, the variable SECTOR is set equal to 
zero for consumer products and 1 for industrial products. Other sectors are not included 
in this study.  
The second control variable is the auditor’s reputation (AUDITOR), which identifies 
whether the firm uses one of the Big Four auditing firms in Malaysia. Large firms are 
expected to have more resources and technical expertise and may be more likely to use 
auditors of the highest reputation (Eng and Mak, 2003; Janssen et al., 2005; Gul et al., 
2009). So we use AUDITOR to control for the possibility that firms audited by one of the 
Big Four extend different levels of trade compared to those that use the services of Non-
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Big Four firms. The variable AUDITOR is a dummy, which is set equal to one if the firm 
is audited by one of the Big Four and zero otherwise.  
The third variable captures the possible effect of family ownership concentration (20% 
or more family ownership). Malaysia has a high level of family ownership concentration 
(Claessens, et al., 2000; Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012) and per capita has one of the highest 
presences of family-owned firms in the world (Claessens et al., 2000; Ismail and 
Sinnadurai, 2012; Sinnadurai, 2015). Family owned-firms are more likely to enjoy 
enhanced earnings quality (Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007) and may, therefore, obtain high 
levels of AR by granting more credit to their customers. The control for family ownership 
captures ownership concentration as a potential determinant of credit granting in the same 
way as dividend policy (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 2003; Mitton, 2004). We 
label this dummy variable OWN, and we set it equal to one if 20% or more of the firm’s 
equity is family owned and zero otherwise. 
Finally, the time effect is accounted for by four time dummies (T2007 to T2010), where 
each dummy-year is set equal to one for that particular year and zero otherwise. These 
four years are contrasted with the year 2006.  
Since the data set consists of observations for 262 firms over five consecutive years, the 
estimation should be undertaken within a panel analysis framework. One advantage of a 
panel regression over a simple cross-section regression is that it provides more flexibility 
when modelling differences in behaviour across different firms. These firm-specific 
effects are accounted for in a natural way in panel data models. However, one particular 
difficulty is whether these effects should be treated as fixed or randomly distributed 
across firms. The fixed effects model assumes that the unobserved firm-specific effects 
are uncorrelated with the regressors, while in the latter case they may be correlated. 
Fortunately, the choice between the fixed or random effects model may be tested 
empirically through the Hausman test which assesses whether the firm-specific factors 
are correlated with the regressors. Rejection of this hypothesis implies that the firm-
specific factors should be treated as fixed (deterministic) rather than random. Table 1 
provides brief definitions of the above independent variables and relates them to the 
study’s hypotheses. 
Table 1: List of Independent and Control Variables 
Hypothesis Explanatory Variables  Definition  
H1 Company’s size (LOGSIZE)  Log (Book Value of Assets)  
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H2 Short-term line of credit 
(STCREDIT)  
Financial Institutions Debts in Current 
Liabilities/Turnover  
H3 Profit and internal cash 
(OPEPROFIT)  
Operating Profit Before Tax (OP) /Revenue(REV)  
H4 Sales growth (SGROWTH)  Percentage Sales Growth  
H5 Collateral to secure 
financing (COLLATERAL)  
Net Fixed Assets /Total Assets  
H6 Liquidity (LIQUID)  Quick Ratio, i.e. the ratio of current assets 
(excluding inventories) over current liabilities  
H7 Gross Margin (GMARGIN)  Gross Profit Margin/Revenue 
Control 
Industry Sector (SECTOR)  Industrial Products = ‘1’, Consumer = zero 
Auditors (AUDITOR) Big Four audit firms = ‘1’, zero otherwise. 
Ownership (OWN)  
 
Family members own 20% or more of 
shareholdings of company = ‘1’, zero otherwise.  
 
4. RESULTS 
Our data consists of 262 firms over a period of five years (2007-2011). Although a pooled 
time series and cross section regression is possible, the potential heterogeneity across 
firms may bias the results. Both fixed effect and random effect approaches are therefore 
adopted.  The following linear equation is proposed: 
  
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡
2
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽9𝐺𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑇2007𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑇2008𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑇2009𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝑇2010𝑖𝑡 
 
 
where 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 takes one of the two AR proxies defined earlier, for firm i in year t, and 𝛼𝑖 is 
a firm specific effect which is assumed either fixed or random depending on the panel 
data model adopted. 
Of the 262 publicly listed firms under study, 66% are in industrial products while the 
remainder specialise in consumer products. Over half the sample (51.14%) employs one 
of the Big Four auditing firms in Malaysia. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables used in 
the analysis. The statistics are summarised across all firm-year observations. A typical 
Malaysian firm has an average AR of just over 66 million RM. The large standard 
deviation of nearly 114 million RM is indicative of large dispersion of credit granting in 
our sample. The most credit offered is just over 1.25 billion RM. This extreme figure 
indicates the potential scale problem stemming from the heterogeneity in firm size across 
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the sample. Once we scale AR by total assets, the figures look more reasonable with an 
average of 16.33% and a maximum of 63.19%. 
Additional calculations reveal that the firms making industrial products have longer days 
outstanding (81.64 days) compared to consumer product manufacturers (65.29 days). 
This is confirmed by the figures on ARTA (16.92% for the industry against 15.18% for 
the non-industry). However, in absolute terms, the AR of the two sectors are of similar 
scale (67.84 million RM against 62.73 million RM) though the industry sector is 
marginally higher. These results are in line with Angappan and Nasruddin (2003), who 
find that industrial product manufacturers have higher levels of AR compared with 
consumer product manufacturers. 
The remaining independent variables also show large variability and extreme cases. The 
short-term credit also reflects a substantial diversity within our sample. The average 
availability of debt (current liabilities) relative to turnover is 0.249%. Given a standard 
deviation of 0.464, which would mean that approximately 95% of firms have credit 
availability of less than 1.2%, this indicates that the majority of firms have little access 
to external funding. Nevertheless, there are a few firms that have much healthier access 
to credit (the maximum being 5.856%).  
The operating profit is negative on average. This is not surprising since our sample 
coincides with the global meltdown of the credit crunch. The growth in sales is about 
11% on average, but includes extremes on both sides. While some firms’ growth declined 
by nearly 94%, that of others exploded by more than 2,254%. The collateral also shows 
a substantial diversity in our sample. Although the avera e is around 3% (with more than 
90% of the firms having less than 9% collateral) there are some outliers with 46.349%. 
The liquidity is very similar. Finally, the gross margin shows a positive average 
profitability of nearly 18%, but a substantial number of firms witnessed losses (the 
standard deviation suggesting that about 95% of firms had gross margins between 
roughly -10% and 46%). 
Pearson’s pairwise correlation matrix is shown in Table 3. As can be seen, the largest 
correlation is between gross margin and operating profit. Although significant at the 1% 
level, the correlation is well below the usual recommended threshold of 0.8 (Gujarati, 
2006). The lowest correlation is -0.358 between short-term credit and operating profit. 
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Overall, the pairwise correlations between the independent variables do not suggest that 
multicollinearity is an issue. 
Table 2 Summary Statistics of the Main Dependent and Independent Variables 
Series  Mean  Std. Error  Minimum  Maximum  
AR (million RM)  66.107  113.996  0.000  1254.185  
ARTA (%)  16.329  9.831  0.000  63.189  
LOGSIZE (log Million RM)  5.483  1.177  3.131  10.171  
STCREDIT (%)  0.249  0.464  0.000  5.856  
OPEPROFIT (million RM)  -0.376  41.465  -873.564  270.306  
SGROWTH (%)  11.058  84.887  -93.987  2254.707  
COLLATERAL (%)  3.057  3.241  0.000  41.989  
LIQUID (%)  2.635  2.987  0.105  46.349  
GMARGIN (%)  17.912  13.977  -71.227  86.280  
 
Table 3. Pairwise Correlations of the Main Independent Variables 
 LOGSIZE  STCREDIT  OPEPROFIT  SGROWTH  COLLATERAL  LIQUID 
CREDIT -0.037      
OPERPROFIT 0.143** -0.358**     
SGROWTH 0.049 -0.070* 0.091**    
COLLATERAL 0.080** -0.174** 0.104** 0.068*   
LIQUID -0.087** -0.240** 0.100** -0.034 -0.023  
GMARGIN 0.113** -0.168** 0.378** 0.060 -0.008 0.103** 
                 ** significant at the 1% level. * significant at the 5% level. 
Table 4 presents the results for the random and fixed effect models for the two dependent 
variables. In both cases the Hausman specification test is highly significant and suggests 
that the fixed effect models are more appropriate. The coefficients for the sector (SEC) 
and ownership (OWN) dummies are not estimated under the fixed specification since the 
fixed effect model wipes out time invariant variables (including the intercept). We will 
therefore rely on the random effect estimates of these dummy variables, while for the 
remaining coefficients we will use the fixed effect estimates. 
The two fixed effect models explain a significant portion of the variability of the trade 
credit measures. The R-squares are 86.9% and 84.6% for AR and ARTA respectively, 
whereas both F-statistics are highly significant, suggesting that the overall fit is 
statistically significant. However, the relative (ARTA) and absolute (AR) measures of 
trade credit do not coincide. The level of AR is explained almost exclusively by size. In 
the AR model, the coefficient associated with LOGSIZE is highly significant and 
positive, suggesting that larger firms grant more trade credit, and hence have high levels 
of AR. This result could have two explanations. One obvious, but less likely, explanation 
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is that only size matters for credit granting. If we were to accept this explanation, then 
only the first hypothesis can be confirmed. However, a more rational explanation is that 
these results are likely to be due to the scale effect. In other words, the results are driven 
by the fact that some firms are larger than others. Since larger firms have relatively larger 
sales, AR are naturally greater for larger firms. This effect could be so important that the 
other explanations such as collateral or liquidity are dwarfed and rendered statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that AR is not an appropriate measure for trade credit since 
the scale effect dominates and obscures other variables. The only other significant 
variable for the AR model is sales growth.  
The model for the relative measure, ARTA, shows a more realistic outcome, albeit with 
a marginally lower coefficient of determination. It is clear that size does not dominate the 
other variables. More importantly, size (H1) has a negative effect on credit granting 
(larger firms extend less credit relative to their size). The coefficient of log-size is -14.36, 
and suggests that an increase from the average firm size of 244 million RM (5.48 log-
million RM) to 665 million RM (6.46 log-million RM) reduces the granting of credit by 
slightly more than 14%. This is contrary to the prediction of our first hypothesis. 
Short-term credit (H2) is highly significant and suggests that a one percentage point 
increase in short-term external finance leads to a decrease in the level of AR of around 
13%. Sales growth (H4) is modelled with a quadratic term in order to capture non-
linearity. Our fourth hypothesis states that both small (or negative) growth and big growth 
lead to higher levels of AR (smile pattern). This can be captured by the linear 
(SGROWTH) and quadratic (SGROWTH2) terms. The smile pattern would be indicated 
by a negative linear coefficient and a positive quadratic coefficient. The results suggest 
the opposite of the smile pattern since the linear term is positive (=0.211) and significant 
while the quadratic coefficient is negative (=-0.0001) and significant. This means that a 
decrease in sales always decreases the level of AR. At the same time, increasing sales 
always leads to increases in AR levels, albeit at a decreasing rate. 
Collateral (H5) is highly significant and has a positive coefficient, suggesting that a one 
percentage point increase in collateral increases AR by 3.56%.  
The remaining variables, namely operating profit (H3) and liquidity (H6), and gross 
margin (H7) are insignificant.  
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The control variables have a mixed effect. The sector, auditor and ownership dummies 
are insignificant (as suggested by the random effect model). The second group of control 
variables are the time dummies related to the crisis period. The 2007 dummy is 
insignificant, meaning that there was no difference in the level of AR between 2006 and 
2007. This is expected as the year 2007 was the beginning the credit crunch whereas 
ARTA is a stock variable that cumulates over one or more years. However, the crisis was 
more clearly felt a year later, starting from 2008. Indeed, the dummies for 2008, 2009 
and 2010 are all highly significant and negative. Thus, the crisis reduced the average 
relative credit granted, probably as a result of financial difficulties, and the increased 
default risk faced by suppliers. 
Table 4. Fixed and Random Effect Panel Data Estimation Results 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the accounts receivable over total revenue reported by the firms extracted from 
www.reuters.com/finance/stocks. 
The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the reported t-statistics are White-   adjusted values to control 
for heteroscedasticity. 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 Fixed Effect                  Random Effect  
  AR ARTA AR ARTA 
 coeff p-val coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
Intercept  
 
    -252.802  0.000  274.935  0.000  
         
LOGSIZE  29.782  0.000  -14.360  0.028  59.228  0.000  -21.214  0.000  
STCREDIT  -0.935  0.832  -13.124  0.001  -4.133  0.328  -13.885  0.000  
OPEPROFIT  -0.014  0.833  0.112  0.078  -0.049  0.466  0.113  0.069  
OPEPROFIT2  -0.0001  0.853  0.0001  0.234  0.000  0.493  0.000  0.263  
SGROWTH  0.105  0.013  0.211  0.000  0.089  0.031  0.204  0.000  
SGROWTH2  -0.0001  0.029  -0.0001  0.000  0.000  0.048  0.000  0.000  
COLLATERAL  0.073  0.945  3.562  0.000  0.561  0.534  5.168  0.000  
LIQUID  0.382  0.613  -0.860  0.220  0.362  0.608  -1.538  0.021  
GMARGIN  -0.172  0.468  -0.298  0.175  -0.390  0.065  -0.271  0.183  
SEC     -1.307  0.903  19.570  0.113  
AUDITOR     8.465  0.403  4.694  0.680  
OWN     2.708  0.790  -9.963  0.393  
T2007  -2.254  0.584  0.971  0.800  -4.534  0.264  0.261  0.945  
T2008  -2.136  0.612  -10.289  0.009  -5.712  0.164  -11.271  0.003  
T2009  -7.105  0.097  -19.565  0.000  -11.178  0.007  -20.068  0.000  
T2010  -3.261  0.439  -22.331  0.000  -7.543  0.065  -22.809  0.000  
𝑅2 0.869 0.846     
Regression F  24.965 20.686     
p-val (F) 0.000 0.000      
Log Likelihood  -7204.54 -7159.16 
Hausman Test 31.609 35.187 
p-val 0.001 0.000 
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5. DISCUSSION 
One important result in this paper relates to the involvement of size both in the definition 
of, and the impact on, the level of AR. If we define trade credit as the level of AR, then 
size is not only positively related to the level of AR, but also virtually the only variable 
that matters. We argue that this scale effect should be controlled for, since large firms 
naturally grant more credit on average. Controlling for the scale effect through the use of 
ARTA reveals interesting insights. First, contrary to expectations, our results show that 
larger Malaysian manufacturing firms grant less trade credit relative to their size. 
Nevertheless, this result is in line with Soufani and Poutziouris (2002) and Delannay and 
Weill (2004) who argue that under market power theory, larger firms have a better 
bargaining position in the trading relationship and, as such, may not need grant credit to 
sell their goods. In fact, given their bargaining power, larger firm are capable of imposing 
stricter conditions for payments and thus may capitalise on their position to reduce the 
costs associated with holding considerable amounts of AR. In addition, Smith (1987) and 
Paul and Boden (2008) argue that larger firms tend to have a good reputation and hence 
tend to grant less credit to their customers who do not need extended time to inspect the 
quality of the products. However, as we reported in the literature review section, the 
majority of existing empirical work has shown a positive relationship between size and 
credit granting. Although the result could be partly sensitive to methodological issues 
(we would have confirmed a positive relationship under an AR definition), it could also 
be specific to Malaysia. Malaysian manufacturing firms may be more efficient at 
collecting debt, or may simply have more market power compared with their counterparts 
in the industrialised economies. Overall, we find insufficient evidence in our sample of 
firms to confirm our first hypothesis. 
Second, the results show that firms in our sample that have access to short-term finance 
are less likely to grant credit. This suggests that the helping-hand theory does not hold as 
far as the Malaysian manufacturing firms are concerned: firms that have better access to 
short-term finance do not use trade credit to pass on the benefit to their customers. Our 
second hypothesis is therefore rejected. Operating profit is found to play no significant 
role in determining the level of AR. While our third hypothesis predicted a smile effect 
(a negative linear coefficient and a positive quadratic coefficient), the result shows that 
the two coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance. Thus, we conclude that whether a firm is more or less profitable has no 
Page 43 of 90 Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Accounting in Em
erging Econom
ies
20 
 
consequence on trade credit granting; the third hypothesis is therefore rejected. Our fourth 
hypothesis, suggesting that the change in sales has a smile effect, is also rejected. Our 
results show that when sales increase, the level of AR increases with them. On the other 
hand, when sales decrease, AR decreases with them but at an increasing rate. This is 
clearly contrary to prior findings which argue that when the level of sales decreases, firms 
use trade credit to increase their sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 
2002; Delannay, 2004; Wilson, 2008). 
Collateral is positively correlated with the level of AR in Malaysian manufacturing firms. 
It seems to play a significant role in decisions over the AR level, implying that those with 
higher tangibility can collateralise their assets to obtain external financing to fund their 
working capital, inter alia, passing on the benefit to their customers by extending them 
credit through AR. This finding is consistent with Levchuk (2013), Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) and Boden and Paul (2014). Our fifth hypothesis is, therefore, the only one we 
could confirm for Malaysian manufacturing firms. Finally, we found no evidence to 
support the remaining hypotheses, Liquidity (H6) and gross margin (H7) both being 
statistically insignificant.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Investment in AR in the Malaysian manufacturing sector is impacted by many of the 
factors implied by either theory or empirical evidence. However, our main finding in this 
paper is that the Malaysian manufacturing sector is rather different. First, while in prior 
studies liquidity and gross margin have been found to have a positive and significant 
effect on the level of AR, our results show that these two factors play no role in 
influencing such level in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. Second, operating profit 
was expected to have a U-shaped effect based on prior findings. This, too, is not supported 
by our results, which suggests that operating profit has no role in determining the scale 
of AR. Third, while size, short-term credit and sales growth have been found to be 
significant, they are nevertheless inconsistent with the expected direction of their 
relationship with trade credit. Both size and short-term credit were expected to play a 
positive role, but were found to have a negative effect instead. Note, however, that size 
does have a positive effect on the level of AR, which is an absolute measure of trade 
credit. However, we argue that AR are naturally linked to firm size and should be 
descaled in order to provide a more relevant measure of trade credit. The only variable 
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that is consistent with prior studies is collateral. This factor was found to have a positive 
effect as expected. The positive association of collateral with the level of AR is the only 
hypothesis confirmed by this study.  
Our results have several principal implications for policy makers. First, we show that 
policy makers should not take a holistic view of the trade credit market. Given that policy 
makers aim to improve liquidity and trade they should design policies that are not only 
country specific but also sector specific. As is clear from our results, what holds for other 
countries or sectors may not necessarily be true for the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
For example, if elsewhere size is positively linked to the level of investment in accounts 
receivable, then government policy (via incentive schemes, for example) should target 
smaller firms because they offer less trade credit. On the other hand, in the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector, the policy should be directed towards larger firms. 
Second, under the new Expected Credit Loss (ECL) provisioning rule of International 
Financial Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9), companies must provide for expected credit 
losses from the time a credit is granted (Cohen and Edwards, 2017). This rule has 
important implications to Malaysian firms in the light of our findings. In particular, we 
found that smaller firms and those firms with lower short-term credit facilities tended to 
offer more trade credit. Thus, because of their reduced size and financial capabilities, 
these firms are particularly vulnerable to credit shocks, and should make provision for 
potential credit losses rather than wait for “trigger events” signalling imminent losses.  
It is disturbing to note that large firms may depend on their bargaining power to the 
detriment of the small and medium sector growth. The Malaysian authorities may 
consider initiatives adopted in the UK and Europe, for example, to protect this important 
asset that many describe as the riskiest in a firm’s balance sheet due to the risk related to 
late payment and possible default that increases the costs of granting credit. In the UK, 
for instance, many Codes and Charters have been introduced to protect companies’ 
investments in AR (especially those of SMEs). These measures include the statutory 
provision of late payment interest legislation, (charging 8% above the bank rate), the 
change to Company Act that emphasises the need for disclosure of payment trends, the 
Prompt Payment code administered by the Chartered Institute for Credit Management on 
behalf of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (such self-regulatory 
devices attempting to alter the behaviour of larger customers by eliciting public 
commitments to ethical and fair behaviour). Other measures include self-regulation, such 
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as Voluntary Codes of Conduct, and business support in the form of enhanced training 
for SMEs. The UK late payment legislation was subsequently adopted by the EU 
(European Union Directive 2000/35/EC.  
Third, trade credit research is highly sensitive to the definition of trade credit. Results, 
therefore, depend primarily on the proxy the researcher uses for the level of credit 
granted. We find clear evidence that the use of AR is likely to distort findings and affect 
the validity of empirical results. 
The absence or negligible impact of the helping hand theory further raises concerns about 
the political economy of the country. It appears that there is a disconnect between large 
and small businesses. Organisations such as the SME Corporation need to harness the 
potential of big businesses to play the “big brother” role to enhance the ecosystem for the 
SME sector. 
Lastly, the low inclination of firms to use trade credit to boost declining sales may need 
to be investigated. Perhaps the enforcement of IAS 39 (or MFRS 139 in Malaysia since 
2010) will deter firms from using this technique. Future research may examine whether 
adoption of IAS 39 has had an effect. 
Our quantitative approach has obvious limitations. First, we used a simple linear model, 
which may be a crude approximation to the true AR data generating process. In particular, 
as AR and ARTA are strictly positive, a Panel Tobit model might be preferred since it 
truncates the data at zero. Second, our model tested AR and ARTA in levels rather than 
differences. One way to extend our study is to investigate the dynamics in trade credit, 
which can be measured using the yearly change in AR and ARTA.   
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Responses to Reviewers 
 
We thank the reviewer for his/her valuable comments, suggestions and insights. We believe we 
have addressed all issues raised, and have no doubt that our paper has improved significantly as 
a result.  
 
Deadline: 21-Aug-2017 
 
Recommendation: Major Revision  
 
A) Comments: Address the above comments to make a significant contribution to the existing 
literature.  
 
We hope we have revised the paper to the referee’s satisfaction. We have reviewed and updated 
all sections to better highlight our contribution. Corresponding references have been 
incorporated in both the text and the reference list. 
 
B) Additional Questions 
 
The responses to each comment made and on each section are presented below. 
 
1) Originality Does the paper contain new and significant information adequate to justify 
publication? 
  
a) The topic is not novel, what would have been novel perhaps could have 
been, the justification for the study, literature gap that the study intended 
to fill and the methodology employed. 
 
b) The main study purpose is not clear 
 
 
a) We thank the referee for this comment, and agree that we could have highlighted our 
contribution more explicitly. We have added the following paragraph explaining that 
most studies in this area focus on developed countries.   
 
 
“There has been sustained interest in managing the level of AR from both academics and 
practitioners, each emphasising the permanent character of this short-term but continuously 
renewed investment and its strategic potential due to the existence of financial, tax-based, 
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operating, transaction and pricing motives (Asselbergh, 1999). Increasingly, the focus has 
shifted to the efficiency of AR management and its relationship with profitability, in both 
developing and developed countries (see, for example, the studies of Michalski (2012)1 in 
Poland; Raheman, and Nasr (2007) in Pakistan; Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2010) in the USA; 
and Singh, Kumar, and Colombage (2017) in India). However, whilst there is ample evidence 
as to why companies in developed countries continue to invest in AR, it is not clear whether 
firms within the developing world have a similar experience.  
 
We have also added two paragraphs (below) to emphasize the relative scarcity of earlier 
studies on Malaysia:  
 
“Clearly, there is a lot at stake, and the risk exposure related to AR in Malaysian firms may 
well exceed the levels experienced in the developed world. Thus, given the risk exposure 
threatening Malaysian firms, it is surprising to find that little research has been conducted as 
to the factors that influence their decision of such firms to carry high levels of AR and so incur 
costs related to investing in this low-return/high-risk asset.  
 
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical work has been dedicated to developed 
economies, especially the US and the UK. These studies suggested a multitude of potential 
factors that influence AR. However, very little research has been carried out on Malaysia. Our 
aim is to fill this gap in the literature by extending our knowledge of AR in one emerging 
economy and potentially drawing lessons for other such economies and developing countries. 
Specifically, our aim is to test on a cross section of Malaysian manufacturing firms, the various 
theories developed within industrialised economies. This will shed light on the various reasons 
that Malaysian businesses invest in AR and assess the relevance of various factors affecting 
the decision to grant trade credit. To our knowledge, this is the first study that looks at the 
factors that influence AR levels in the Malaysian manufacturing sector.” 
 
                                                 
1 G Michalski - 2012 Efficiency of accounts receivable management in Polish institutions- papers.ssrn.com 
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b) A section has been added to clarify this. 
 
We thank the referee for bringing this point to our attention. In order to explain better why 
studying the factors influencing trade credit in Malaysia is important, we have modified 
certain existing paragraphs. In addition, we suggest the following new paragraphs: 
 
“This brings us to the important question of why firms in Malaysia invest in this risky asset. 
Previous research from developed economies has evidenced a variety of reasons as to why 
firms accept delayed payment and invest in this low-return, high-risk asset (Paul and Boden, 
2008).” 
 
“Specifically, although selling on credit increases sales and often improves customer loyalty, 
it nevertheless increases financial costs and exposes firms to significant risks associated with 
delayed payment and default. The i creased risk involved with trade credit may be particularly 
relevant to Malaysia. Indeed, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, a credit squeeze was cited 
as one of the main causes of the collapse of many Malaysian firms (Thomas, 2002).”  
 
2) Relationship 
to Literature 
Does the paper demonstrate an adequate understanding of the relevant literature in 
the field and cite an appropriate range of literature sources?  Is any significant 
work ignored?  
 
a) This section was done in a rush I would say. 
 
b) The hypotheses have been mechanically developed. 
 
c) The literature does not adequately demonstrate the interplay between the 
study variable. For instance, H1 reads "Larger firms are expected to have 
higher levels of accounts receiveables" But the literature write up does 
not demonstrate exactly how this happens. Same applies to all other 
hypotheses. 
 
d) H4: The sales growth has a smile effect on the level of accounts 
receivable, namely, both 
positive and negative growth in sales lead to higher levels of accounts 
receivable. ... and many others stated as such...the question is how can 
both positive and negative effects lead to higher levels of accounts 
receivables??? When followed to the results and discussion sections, this 
is not clearly demonstrated. I suggest a revisit of all study hypotheses. 
 
e) The theories and authors of the suggested theories does not come out 
well. And besides, there is need to mention the limitations of those 
theories. 
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a) We thank the referee for this comment, which we think is a fair one. We deliberately 
integrated the literature review with the development of our hypotheses as most of what 
has been covered regarding the choice of variables included in our modelling explains 
what has been written in the area. However, we have now added four pages to update the 
first part of the literature review and we believe we have improved this section to meet 
with the referee’s fair request. 
 
As well as the paragraphs below, we also made a number of changes in the explanation of 
variables to avoid duplication. 
 
“Trade credit is a practice as old as trade itself. At its heart lies the precept that customers will 
honour their commitment to make payment at the agreed time. Sellers agree to a time lapse 
between the delivery of goods and the payment for them. These deliveries are recorded as AR. 
However, although AR may help boost sales, payment delays or even defaults may and do 
occur. As such, AR also creates potential costs that can exceed the benefits gained by selling 
on credit. This two-sided contingency makes investing in AR a complex decision for businesses 
and an interesting phenomenon to academics. 
 
However, despite potential losses, evidence from markets around the world shows that most 
business-to-business transactions are undertaken on credit, often resulting in high levels of AR 
(Summers and Wilson, 2002; Kling et al., 2014). Trade credit is very important; it is greater in 
volume than the flows of short-term bank borrowing in nearly all developing and industrialised 
countries (Guido 2003; Blasio, 2003). In the UK, for instance, AR stand at around 37% of total 
business assets (Paul and Wilson, 2006, 2007). In both the UK and the USA, trade credit 
exceeds the primary money supply by a factor of about 1.5. Trade credit is considered one of 
the most important forms of finance, exceeding the short-term business lending of the entire 
banking system (Lee and Stowe, 1993; Ng et al., 1999; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Aaronson 
et al., 2004; Boden and Paul, 2014). Kling et al. (2014) examine the link between trade and 
short term bank credit and provide evidence that they are complementary, a findi g that was 
also supported by both Bias and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). Trade credit 
is therefore an important source of trade liquidity, as well as a useful source of money supply. 
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At the micro level, trade credit is seen by firms as an essential marketing tool that helps their 
competitiveness and growth (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Ai-guo (2006) finds that firms invest 
in AR to reinforce their market position, making them more competitive, increasing their sales 
and reducing their inventories. Kling et al. (2014) find that UK firms have had to invest in AR 
to maintain sales and remain competitive.  
 
Trade credit is also an essential part of working capital; the level of AR has a direct impact on 
other elements of firms’ working capital, such as cash flow and inventory holding. Michalski 
(2012) reports that any change in the level of AR affects the level of working capital. It is often 
argued that cash volatility, for instance, affects the AR level and that firms with limited access 
to external funds invest less in AR (Summers and Wilson, 2002). In the same vein, firms with 
higher cash-flow volatility tend to hold higher levels of cash and hence to invest less in AR by 
reducing the level of credit granted to their customers (Molina and Preve, 2009; Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz, 2009). Choi and Kim (2003) find that firms tend to increase their AR level when the 
level of their inventories rises.  
 
Others argue that investing in AR is a way of channelling funds from cash rich firms to their 
financially constrained customers (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga, 2013; Levchuk, 2013) with the aim of enhancing long-term relationships. Others still 
report a positive relationship between the level of AR and the increase in shareholder wealth 
(Hill, et al., 2013). Nevertheless, too high a level of AR can be associated with lower 
profitability (Padachi, 2006) as sellers are effectively financing their customers’ inventory for 
an agreed period into the future, and granting credit entails substantial costs as well as risks. If 
AR can increase both the cost of credit and the risk of default, it begs the question as to why 
companies invest in this asset at all. 
 
Rationally, the risks of investing in AR should be outweighed by the benefits discussed above 
(Paul and Boden, 2008; Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Some have argued that the benefits result 
from a reduction in transaction costs: selling on credit allows firms to accumulate invoices for 
payment and reduce their transaction costs and this may incentivise them to invest more in AR 
(Main and Smith, 1982; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Pike and Cheng, 2001; Soufani and 
Poutziouris, 2002). Others have emphasised the benefits gained from building customer 
Page 55 of 90 Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Accounting in Em
erging Econom
ies
relationship to help repeat business and thus gain competitive advantage (Jacob, 1994; Wilson 
and Summers, 2002; Fisman and Raturi, 2004; Cuñat, 2007; Burkart et al., 2011). Other still 
looked at the helping hand theory where, through trade credit, funds are channelling from cash-
rich firms to those with limited borrowing power in the supply chain (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Pike and Cheng, 2001; Atansova and Wilson, 2003). This process facilitates financial 
efficiency across supply chains between suppliers and customers (Hoffman and Kotzab, 2010). 
It is also argued that the benefits come from better communication between buyers and sellers 
(Jain, 2001; Wilson, 2008; Boden and Paul 2014).  Investment in AR leads to mitigating the 
asymmetry of information for both parties. Buyers have time to inspect the quality of the goods 
before payment, and sellers to collect important information about the buyers’ financial health 
through risk assessment before granting credit. Therefore, in the process of granting credit, 
buyers and sellers gain vital information about each other. The warranty of product quality 
reduces the risk of late payment and default, whereas the information collected in the process 
can be used effectively to assess the creditworthiness of customers before further credit is 
granted. This can speed up the return on AR.  
 
A number of theories have been developed to explain the factors influencing the level of AR 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Pike and Chen, 2002; Paul and Boden, 
2008, 2011; Boden and Paul, 2014). Some theories emphasise the role of factors such as 
company size, access to internal/external financing, operating profit and sales revenue growth, 
liquidity and collateral (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Paul and 
Boden, 2008). Others have added factors such as industry norms (Wilson, 2008; Paul and 
Boden, 2011), the reputation of the firm’s auditor (Gul, et al., 2009; Paul et al., 2012) and 
ownership (Martínez et al., 2007; Carney and Child, 2012). Empirical support for the relevance 
of the various extant theories in this area can be found in the work of, for example, Petersen 
and Rajan, (1997), Marotta (2000), Pike and Cheng (2002), Soufani and Poutziouris (2002), 
Levchuk, (2013), Delannay and Weill (2004), Rodriguez (2006). However, there is very little 
empirical evidence on the role of the proposed factors in explaining how much firms are 
prepared to invest in AR within emerging and developing economies, especially in Asia 
(Zainudin, 2008; Love and Zaidi, 2010). Most of the empirical literature has focused 
particularly on the US and the UK.  
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In the next subsections, we describe the factors put forward in the literature to explain decisions 
on the level of AR and these include: firm size, access to internal/external financing, operating 
profit, sales revenue growth, price discrimination, liquidity and collateral to secure financing. 
Based on the literature, seven hypotheses are proposed to examine the determinants of the scale 
of AR in the Malaysian manufacturing sector.” 
 
b) We have followed current practice within accounting and management literature by 
relating existing theoretical and empirical work to our proposed hypotheses. Whenever 
there are conflicting results (theoretical or empirical), we have adopted the position of the 
majority of papers on that particular hypothesis. Moreover, when we were developing the 
hypotheses, we kept in mind the need to keep the length of the paper to manageable 
proportions. As it stands, the paper is already more than 8,000 words and we will 
probably be asked to reduce the word count. Given that we had seven hypotheses, we were 
forced to be ‘economical’ for otherwise the paper would simply be too long. Nevertheless, 
although we believe that for each hypothesis we have used the most important papers in 
the field, we would be happy to extend our discussion of the hypotheses if requested. 
 
 
c) We have set out how we came up with each of the hypotheses. Taking H1 as an example, 
we explain that “Larger firms are perceived to be more creditworthy and to have more 
capacity to invest more in AR by granting more credit to their customers…. Large firms 
also have too high a transaction volume to deal with cash sales … selling on credit allows 
firms to accumulate invoices for payment and reduce their transaction costs and thus this 
incentivises them to invest more in AR…” Nevertheless, we do appreciate the referee’s 
concerns that the explanations as to how these factors function fundamentally are not 
obvious. In fact, they cannot as unlike other scientific fields, where researchers can use 
laboratories or test behaviour on individuals, there is no data on firms' behaviour. All we 
observe is the annual (bottom line) accounts. This is why it is virtually impossible to gauge 
the behaviour of the firm. 
 
 
d) The smile effect (and hump effect) are very well known patterns in social and biomedical 
sciences. For example, taking too few vitamins (or too many) may increase the probability 
of disease (the lowest probability of disease somewhere in between). As we have explained 
in the text, when sales are plentiful the firm invests more in AR as it can afford to take a 
higher level of risk. However, when sales are very low the firm becomes ‘desperate’ as 
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inventories pile up (thereby incurring costs associated with holding high levels of 
inventories, including obsolescence), and cash is tied up in unsold inventories. Thus to 
encourage sales and revenues, the firm may be forced to take on more risk by granting 
further trade credit (probably to less creditworthy customers). Therefore, trade credit, in 
such instances, is used as a marketing tool to counter the sales decline and such marketing 
is one of the motives most cited in the literature for granting trade credit (the others 
including financing, and building relationships, Wilson et all., Pike et al., Paul et al., etc. 
as per our references).  
 
 
e) We are very sorry but we are not sure we understand the referee’s comment on this point. 
However, we hope that the new insertion under literature deals with the concern raised. 
We were also constrained by the size of our paper, regarding the number of other papers 
we could review in developing our hypotheses. Nevertheless, we did cover the most 
important and widely-cited papers on the subject and most of the authors we referred to 
are leaders in this field. Furthermore, we specifically tried to select papers that are 
directly relevant to the reasons companies invest in accounts receivable. 
 
 
3) Methodology Is the paper's argument built on an appropriate base of theory, concepts, or other 
ideas?  Has the research or equivalent intellectual work on which the paper is 
based been well designed?  Are the methods employed appropriate? 
 
a) The study makes use of secondary data, and uses the fixed and random 
effects for data analysis. Nonetheless, there is need to provide concrete 
justification for not using pooled time series. 
  
b) There is need to highlight the limitations of the quantitative approach that 
was employed for the benefit of researchers and practitioners. (though this 
information should appear at the end of the write up of the paper/ last 
section). 
 
 
 
a) It is well known that pooled time-series cross-section regressions do not account for 
unobserved heterogeneity in firms (fixed effect).  Ignoring these firm effects produces 
biased estimates and invalidates inference.  Indeed, we have found that the Chi-square 
test is highly significant, thus rejecting the redundancy of the fixed effects.  
 
 
b) We thank the referee for this insightful comment. We have added the following paragraph 
at the end of the paper highlighting the limitations of our quantitative approach: 
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“Our quantitative approach has obvious limitations. First, we used a simple linear model, which 
may be a crude approximation to the true AR data generating process. In particular, as AR and 
ARTA are strictly positive, a Panel Tobit model might be preferred since it truncates the data 
at zero. Second, our model tested AR and ARTA in levels rather than differences. One way to 
extend our study is to investigate the dynamics in trade credit, which can be measured using 
the yearly change in AR and ARTA.”   
   
4) Results Are results presented clearly and analysed appropriately?  Do the conclusions 
adequately tie together the other elements of the paper? 
  
The results: 
a) have not been presented according to the hypotheses set to be tested. As 
such, it is difficult to say whether all the hypotheses were tested. 
Interpretation of the results and discussion have to be further refined to 
clearly demonstrate the interplay between the study variables. 
 
b) Seem to be contrary to the existing theories and empirical studies, but not 
proper justification of debate has been fronted for this. Consider collecting 
some primary data to explain the controversies in the results. 
 
c) Looking at the topic, the story does not come out clearly in the results and 
discussion section. This has to be aligned. 
 
 
 
a) We are grateful for this remark. We agree that we did not mention each hypothesis 
specifically nor the relationship of each to the estimated model. We have now corrected 
this problem and ensured that each coefficient is explicitly related to its hypothesis. The 
confusion may have arisen because we did not treat the hypotheses in their numerical 
order. The reason is simply that previously we opted to highlight the significant 
coefficients first (H1, H2, H4, H5), and then mention the three insignificant coefficients 
related to H3, H6 and H7. 
 
 
b) In Malaysia, there is a lack of information on trade credit. At the beginning of this study, 
we tried to collect data from companies through questionnaires but had a very low 
response rate, those firms that did reply hardly answering the questions, and claiming 
that the information we sought was of a sensitive nature. Therefore, the few responses 
received were incomplete and not timely.  In fact, companies themselves claimed that the 
lack of information made it difficult for them to assess the creditworthiness of their 
customers.  They reported that what was available was deemed sensitive, confidential and 
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incomplete. We also approached a few companies for interviews but none was willing to 
take part. They were concerned that the information would reflect negatively on them as 
most carry high levels of AR and suffer from late payment. As such, the use of primary 
data on AR in Malaysia would not be appropriate due to the perceived sensitivity of the 
information. We judge this is one of the reasons that not many studies of trade credit are 
conducted in Malaysia generally. Furthermore, even in developed countries most 
research is based on secondary data (very few being based on questionnaires, while some 
are of a qualitative nature).  
 
 
c) We have now reviewed the entire paper in the light of the comments made, which we 
greatly appreciate,  and have made the changes accordingly. 
 
 
5) 
Implications 
Implication for research, practice and/or society:  Does the paper identify clearly 
any implications for research, practice and/or society?  Does the paper bridge the 
gap between theory and practice? How can the research be used in practice 
(economic and commercial impact), in teaching, to influence public policy, in 
research (contributing to the body of knowledge)?  What is the impact upon society 
(influencing public attitudes, affecting quality of life)?  Are these implications 
consistent with the findings and conclusions of the paper? 
 
    a) This is evidently lacking. 
 
 
a) We thank the referee for this comment. We agree that a summary of the paper’s 
implications was previously lacking and we have added several paragraphs at the end of 
the paper to rectify this problem, as follows: 
 
“Our results have several principal implications for policy makers. First, we show that policy 
makers should not take a holistic view of the trade credit market. Given that policy makers aim 
to improve liquidity and trade they should design policies that are not only country specific but 
also sector specific. As is clear from our results, what holds for other countries or sectors may 
not necessarily be true for the Malaysian manufacturing sector. For example, if elsewhere size 
is positively linked to the level of investment in accounts receivable, then government policy 
(via incentive schemes, for example) should target smaller firms because they offer less trade 
credit. On the other hand, in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, the policy should be directed 
towards larger firms. 
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Second, under the new Expected Credit Loss (ECL) provisioning rule of International Financial 
Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9), companies must provide for expected credit losses from the 
time a credit is granted (Cohen and Edwards, 2017). This rule has important implications to 
Malaysian firms in the light of our findings. In particular, we found that smaller firms and those 
firms with lower short-term credit facilities tended to offer more trade credit. Thus, because of 
their reduced size and financial capabilities, these firms are particularly vulnerable to credit 
shocks, and should make provision for potential credit losses rather than wait for “trigger 
events” signalling imminent losses.  
 
It is disturbing to note that large firms may depend on their bargaining power to the detriment 
of the small and medium sector growth. The Malaysian authorities may consider initiatives 
adopted in the UK and Europe, for example, to protect this important asset that many describe 
as the riskiest in a firm’s balance sheet due to the risk related to late payment and possible 
default that increases the costs of granting credit. In the UK, for instance, many Codes and 
Charters have been introduced to protect companies’ investments in AR (especially those of 
SMEs). These measures include the statutory provision of late payment interest legislation, 
(charging 8% above the bank rate), the change to Company Act that emphasises the need for 
disclosure of payment trends, the Prompt Payment code administered by the Chartered Institute 
for Credit Management on behalf of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (such 
self-regulatory devices attempting to alter the behaviour of larger customers by eliciting public 
commitments to ethical and fair behaviour). Other measures include self-regulation, such as 
Voluntary Codes of Conduct, and business support in the form of enhanced training for SMEs. 
The UK late payment legislation was subsequently adopted by the EU (European Union 
Directive 2000/35/EC.  
 
Third, trade credit research is highly sensitive to the definition of trade credit. Results, 
therefore, depend primarily on the proxy the researcher uses for the level of credit granted. We 
find clear evidence that the use of AR is likely to distort findings and affect the validity of 
empirical results. 
 
The absence or negligible impact of the helping hand theory further raises concerns about the 
political economy of the country. It appears that there is a disconnect between large and small 
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businesses. Organisations such as the SME Corporation need to harness the potential of big 
businesses to play the “big brother” role to enhance the ecosystem for the SME sector. 
 
Last y, the low inclination of firms to use trade credit to boost declining sales may need to be 
investigated. Perhaps the enforcement of IAS 39 (or MFRS 139 in Malaysia since 2010) will 
deter firms from using this technique. Future research may examine whether adoption of IAS 
39 has had an effect.” 
 
E(6) 6. Quality of Communication:  Does the paper clearly express its case, measured against the 
technical language of the field and the expected knowledge of the journal's readership?  Has 
attention been paid to the clarity of expression and readability, such as sentence structure, 
jargon use, acronyms, etc.:  
 
Right from the introduction section, there is need to maintain a coherent and chronological 
flow of thoughts. 
 
 
 
We have re-written the paper and made significant improvement, which, we hope will make the 
paper more readable and more interesting to readers. We also re-written the conclusion to 
reflect the changes made. Many thanks indeed.  
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WHY DO FIRMS INVEST IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE? 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE MALAYSIAN 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that influence Malaysian 
manufacturing sector investment in accounts receivable, an asset seen by many 
as one of the riskiest in any company’s balance sheet. We test several theories, 
related to accounts receivable, using a cross-section of 262 listed manufacturing 
firms over a period of five years (2007-2011). Both fixed and random effect 
approaches are considered to deal with potential heterogeneity across firms. Our 
results show that the absolute level of accounts receivable is almost exclusively 
explained by size. However, the ratio of accounts receivable to assets is 
influenced by firm size, short-term finance, sales growth, and collateral. Profit, 
liquidity and gross margin have no role in affecting the decision to grant trade 
credit to customers. Some of our results are mostly inconsistent with previous 
studies. Size and short-term finance have a negative, rather than a positive, 
impact. Liquidity and gross margin have no, rather than a positive, effect. Profit 
and sales growth are expected to exhibit a U-shaped relationship with 
investment in accounts receivable. We found, however, that the former is 
insignificant while the latter is strictly increasing. The only factor found to be 
consistent with prior studies, in developed counties, is collateral. Our findings 
have important implications for policy makers in Malaysia and other emerging 
economies, especially in the light of the forthcoming International Financial 
Reporting Standard 9.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Accounts receivable (AR) occur when suppliers of goods and services
1
 sell on credit 
and thus allow their customers to defer payment to a later date. This type of credit is 
granted by firms whose primary business is to sell goods, rather than to provide finance 
to customers. Sale on credit creates AR, a current asset in the balance sheet of suppliers. 
Thus AR are the amounts outstanding payable by customers to their suppliers. Given 
the high volume of sales on credit between businesses, AR are especially high and are 
considered by many as the riskiest asset in a firm’s balance sheet (Pike and Cheng, 
2001; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Boden and Paul, 2014).  
There has been sustained interest in managing the level of AR from both academics and 
practitioners, each emphasising the permanent character of this short-term but 
continuously renewed investment and its strategic potential due to the existence of 
financial, tax-based, operating, transactional and pricing motives (Asselbergh, 1999; 
Paul and Boden, 2008). Increasingly, the focus has shifted to the efficiency of AR 
management and its relationship with profitability, in both developing and developed 
countries (see, for example, the studies of Michalski (2012) in Poland; Raheman, and 
Nasr (2007) in Pakistan; Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2010) in the USA; Singh, Kumar, and 
Colombage (2017) in India). However, whilst there is ample evidence as to why 
companies in developed countries continue to invest in AR, it is not clear whether firms 
within the developing world have a similar experience.
2
 Orobia, Padachi and  Munene 
(2016) observe that the most frequently performed routines relate to safeguarding cash 
and inventory, and to credit risk assessment. Payment management routines are the least 
performed. This suggests that firms in emerging countries may face difficulties in 
managing their extended credit. 
This brings us to the important question of why firms in Malaysia invest in this risky 
asset. Previous research from developed economies has evidenced a variety of reasons 
as to why firms accept delayed payment and invest in this low-return, high-risk asset 
(Paul and Boden, 2008). Specifically, although selling on credit increases sales and 
                                                
1
 Henceforth, we shall use goods to mean goods and/or services. 
2
 A Google Scholar search for articles and patents with Accounts Receivable in the title since 2010 
returned a total of 287 articles and patents. Although we used the title and abstract only to identify the 
country of interest, the vast majority of articles and patents were related to the US and Europe. China 
followed as the third most studied country, albeit mostly in local Chinese journals. Of the 287 items, 
seven were related to East- European, five to African, and four to Middle- and Far-Eastern countries. 
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often improves customer loyalty, it nevertheless increases financial costs and exposes 
firms to significant risks associated with delayed payment and default. The increased 
risk involved with trade credit may be particularly relevant to Malaysia. Indeed, during 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, a credit squeeze was cited as one of the main causes of 
the collapse of many Malaysian firms (Thomas, 2002). Clearly, there is a lot at stake, 
and the risk exposure related to AR in Malaysian firms may well exceed the levels 
experienced in the developed world. Thus, given the risk exposure threatening 
Malaysian firms, it is surprising to find that little research has been conducted as to the 
factors that influence the decisions of such firms to carry high levels of AR and so incur 
costs related t  investing in this low-return/high-risk asset. 
The introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9,
3
 which 
will become effective in 2018, has drawn some attention to trade receivables (accounts 
receivable). KPMG (2016) predict that bad debt provisions are likely to increase and 
become more volatile. Indeed, the challenges of IFRS 9 may go beyond accounting and 
require changes to systems and processes. This study seeks to illuminate the intricacies 
of accounts receivable that may be a major concern for Malaysian non-financial 
corporates. Companies will probably need to review their processes of trade credit 
provision.  
The literature on IFRS adoption suggests that financing decisions are heterogeneous 
among companies from different regions and countries (Al-Yaseen and Al-Khadash, 
2011; dos Santos, Fávero and Distadio, 2016; Sayed, 2017) and that they impact their 
emerging capital markets (Mhedhbi, et al., 2016; Uzma, 2016). Moreover, emerging 
countries may face issues with compliance with financial instruments standards (Tahat, 
Mardini and Power, 2017).  
A substantial body of theoretical and empirical work has been dedicated to the 
developed economies, especially the US and the UK. These studies have suggested a 
multitude of potential factors that influence AR. However, very little research has been 
carried out on Malaysia. Our aim is to fill this gap in the literature by extending our 
knowledge of AR in an emerging economy and potentially drawing lessons for other 
such economies and developing countries. Specifically, our aim is to test, using a cross 
section of Malaysian manufacturing firms, the various theories developed within 
                                                
3
 Referred to in Malaysia as Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (MFRS) 9. 
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industrialised economies. This will shed light on the different reasons that Malaysian 
businesses invest in AR and will assess the relevance of various factors affecting the 
decision to grant trade credit. To our knowledge, this is the first study that looks at the 
factors that influence AR levels in the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
The Malaysian manufacturing sector is a major player in the Malaysian economy as it 
accounts for approximately 30% of Malaysian GDP. However, the sector suffers from 
late payment problems (Infocredit D&B, 2005).
4
 High levels of AR are often imposed 
on companies that are pressured into granting credit to customers in order to survive 
and compete (Paul et al., 2012). Moreover, the Malaysian legal process for debt 
recovery is tedious, time-consuming and costly (Thomas, 2002).  
Whilst banks and financial companies are bracing themselves to deal with the 
implementation of IFRS 9, effective from 1 January 2018, we expect the attention of 
non-financial companies to be directed towards managing their AR. Receivables 
management is an important tool for the elimination of credit losses and constitutes an 
essential part of the financial management of each company. Thus, understanding the 
determinants of credit extension is critical. Our paper contributes to the existing 
literature on trade receivables management from an emerging economy perspective. It 
serves to bring focus to a topic that is almost ignored in most emerging economies but 
which will gain prominence with the implementation of IFRS 9. 
Indeed, most of the prior empirical results from those developed economies considered 
do not seem to hold for the Malaysian industrial sector. For example, in previous 
studies size and short-term finance have been found to impact accounts receivable 
positively. We find a negative relationship. The U-shaped relationship between sales 
growth and accounts receivable is rejected for our sample of Malaysian firms. 
Collateral is the only factor in which our study and previous studies in the developed 
economies agree. Accordingly, the implications for policy makers in Malaysia, and 
possibly other emerging economies, may be quite different from those that apply in 
countries like the US and the UK.  
The rest of the paper is organised into five sections. In section 2, we explain, by 
reference to the literature, the factors that incentivise firms to grant loans to their 
customers through AR and develop a number of hypotheses. In section 3, we explain 
                                                
4 As reported in the Credence by Infocredit, Issue 2, July to Sept 2005. 
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the methodology employed in the study and this is followed by a presentation of the 
models used for the empirical investigation in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results, 
and the final section sets out the conclusions. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Trade credit is a practice as old as trade itself. At its heart lies the precept that 
customers will honour their commitment to make payment at the agreed time. Sellers 
agree to a time lapse between the delivery of goods and the payment for them. These 
deliveries are recorded as AR. However, although AR may help boost sales, payment 
delays and even defaults may and do occur. As such, AR also creates potential costs 
that can exceed the benefits gained from selling on credit. This two-sided contingency 
makes investing in AR a complex decision for businesses and an interesting 
phenomenon to academics. 
However, despite potential losses, evidence from markets around the world shows that 
most business-to-business transactions are undertaken on credit, often resulting in high 
levels of AR (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Kling et al., 2014). Trade credit is very 
important; it is greater in volume than the flows of short-term bank borrowing in nearly 
all developing and industrialised countries (Guido 2003; Blasio, 2003). In the UK, for 
instance, AR stand at around 37% of total business assets (Paul and Wilson, 2006, 
2007). In both the UK and the USA, trade credit exceeds the primary money supply by 
a factor of about 1.5. It is one of the most important forms of finance, exceeding the 
short-term business lending of the entire banking system (Lee and Stowe, 1993; Ng et 
al., 1999; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Aaronson et al., 2004; Boden and Paul, 2014). 
Kling et al. (2014) examine the link between trade and short-term bank credit and 
provide evidence that they are complementary, a finding that was also supported by 
both Bias and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004). Trade credit is therefore 
an important source of trade liquidity, as well as a useful source of money supply.  
At the micro level, trade credit is seen by firms as an essential marketing tool that helps 
their competitiveness and growth (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Ai-guo (2006) finds that 
firms invest in AR to reinforce their market position, making them more competitive, 
increasing their sales and reducing their inventories. Barrot (2016) goes further and 
provides evidence that any reduction in investment in AR leads to an increase in the 
corporate default probability while Kling et al. (2014) find that UK firms have had to 
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invest in AR to maintain sales and remain competitive. In the same vein, it has been 
shown that when trade credit is restricted, trade between buyers and sellers decreases 
(Breza and Liberman, 2017). 
Trade credit is also an essential part of working capital. The level of AR has a direct 
impact on other elements of firms’ working capital, such as cash flow and inventory 
holding. Michalski (2012) reports that any change in the level of AR affects the level of 
working capital. It is often argued that cash volatility, for instance, affects the AR level 
and that firms with limited access to external funds invest less in AR (Summers and 
Wilson, 2002). In the same vein, firms with higher cash-flow volatility tend to hold 
higher levels of cash and hence to invest less in AR by reducing the level of credit 
granted to their customers (Molina and Preve, 2009; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). 
Choi and Kim (2003) find that firms tend to increase their AR level when the level of 
their inventories rises.  
Others argue that investing in AR is a way of channelling funds from cash rich firms to 
their financially constrained customers (Ge and Qiu, 2007; Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Levchuk, 2013; Boden and Paul, 2014) with the aim of 
enhancing long-term relationships. Others still report a positive relationship between 
the level of AR and the increase in shareholder wealth (Hill, et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
too high a level of AR can be associated with lower profitability (Padachi, 2006) as 
sellers are effectively financing their customers’ inventory for an agreed period into the 
future, and granting credit entails substantial costs as well as risks. If AR can increase 
both the cost of credit and the risk of default, it begs the question as to why companies 
invest in this asset at all. 
Rationally, the risks of investing in AR should be outweighed by the benefits discussed 
above (Paul and Boden, 2008; Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Some have argued that the 
benefits result from a reduction in transaction costs: selling on credit allows firms to 
accumulate invoices for payment and reduce their transaction costs and this may 
incentivise them to invest more in AR (Main and Smith, 1982; Petersen and Rajan, 
1997; Pike and Cheng, 2001; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). Others have emphasised 
the benefits gained from building customer relationships to help repeat business and 
thus gain competitive advantage (Jacob, 1994; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Fisman and 
Raturi, 2004; Cuñat, 2007; Burkart et al., 2011). Other still looked at the helping hand 
theory where, through trade credit, funds are channelling from cash-rich firms to those 
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with limited borrowing power in the supply chain (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Pike and 
Cheng, 2001; Atanasova and Wilson, 2003). In Europe, for instance, when SMEs are 
unable to obtain finance from banks, they rely heavily on trade credit from their 
suppliers (Casey and O'Toole, 2014; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2016). 
This process facilitates financial efficiency across supply chains between suppliers and 
customers (Hoffman and Kotzab, 2010). It is also argued that the benefits come from 
better communication between buyers and sellers (Jain, 2001; Wilson, 2008; Boden and 
Paul 2014).  Investment in AR leads to mitigating the asymmetry of information for 
both parties. Buyers have time to inspect the quality of the goods before payment, and 
sellers to collect important information about the buyers’ financial health through risk 
assessment before granting credit. Therefore, in the process of requesting/granting 
credit, buyers and sellers gain vital information about each other. The warranty of 
product quality reduces the risk of late payment and default, whereas the information 
collected in the process can be used effectively to assess the creditworthiness of 
customers before further credit is granted. This can speed up the return on AR which in 
turn informs the systems and processes that need to be in place to facilitate the 
implementation of the expected credit loss model under MFRS 9. 
A number of theories have been developed to explain the level of AR (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Wilson and Summers, 2002; Pike and Chen, 2002; Paul and Boden, 2008, 
2011; Boden and Paul, 2014). Some theories emphasise the role of factors such as 
company size, access to internal/external financing, operating profit and sales revenue 
growth, liquidity and collateral (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 
2002; Paul and Boden, 2008). Others have added factors such as industry norms 
(Wilson, 2008; Paul and Boden, 2011), the reputation of the firm’s auditor (Gul, et al., 
2009; Paul et al., 2012) and ownership (Martínez et al., 2007; Carney and Child, 2012). 
Empirical support for the relevance of the various extant theories in this area can be 
found in the work of, for example, Petersen and Rajan, (1997), Marotta (2000), Pike 
and Cheng (2002), Soufani and Poutziouris (2002), Levchuk, (2013), Delannay and 
Weill (2004), Rodriguez (2006). However, there is very little empirical evidence on the 
role of the proposed factors in explaining how much firms are prepared to invest in AR 
within emerging and developing economies, especially in Asia (Zainudin, 2008; Love 
and Zaidi, 2010). Most of the empirical literature has focused particularly on the US 
and the UK, even though firms in less developed Asian economies have been found to 
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be more reliant on finance from trade credit than is the case with firms from more 
developed economies (Ge and Qiu, 2007).  
In the next subsections, we describe the factors put forward in the literature to explain 
decisions on the level of AR. These include: firm size, access to internal/external 
financing, operating profit, sales revenue growth, price discrimination, liquidity and 
collateral to secure financing. Based on the literature, seven hypotheses are proposed 
here to examine the determinants of the scale of AR in the Malaysian manufacturing 
sector.  
2.1. Firm Size  
It is argued that firm size plays a major role in determining the scale of AR. Larger 
firms are perceived to be more creditworthy and to have a higher capacity for greater 
investment in AR by granting more credit to their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Main and Smith, 1982; Pike and Cheng, 2001; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). They 
also have too high a transaction volume to deal with cash sales (Summers and Wilson, 
2002; Boden and Paul, 2014). Nevertheless, market power theory suggests that larger 
firms tend to have a stronger bargaining position in the trading relationship with their 
customers and, thus, may not need to hold considerable amounts of AR. Consequently, 
they impose stricter conditions for payments (Delannay and Weill, 2004). However, 
most empirical evidence shows that characteristics such as firm size do play a positive 
effect on the level of AR (Ng et al., 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson and 
Summers, 2002; Delannay and Weill, 2004; Paul and Wilson, 2006; Boden and Paul, 
2014). Hence:  
H1: Larger firms tend to invest more in AR.  
 2.2. Access to External Short-Term Finance  
Financial strength plays a major role in the decision to invest in AR (Wilson, 2008). 
Thus, firms with high borrowing capability are more likely to invest in AR by granting 
more credit to their customers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 
2002; Ge and Qiu, 2007). Such firms tend to help those customers which are heavily 
reliant on them to finance their working capital needs (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). Thus, credit from suppliers is offered to complement, 
and/or substitute for, other sources of funds to support valuable customers financially. 
Furthermore, a lack of finance is often exacerbated by financial crises and, when banks 
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tighten lending, trade borrowing becomes a source of finance for the survival and 
growth of firms of all sizes (Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). We therefore expect a 
positive relationship between short-term lines of credit and AR:  
H2: Firms with greater access to external short-term financing are expected to 
invest more in AR.  
2.3 Access to Internal Short-Term Finance and Profit  
Financial theory posits that profitable firms with sound internal cash-flow generating 
capability tend to grant credit to their customers and thus to carry high AR levels 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Levchuk, 2013). Delannay and Weill 
(2004) find that profitability is positively linked with the AR ratio. In the same vein, Ge 
and Qiu, (2007) show that, given their healthy financial situation, profitable firms are 
more inclined to grant credit to their customers. However, applying the distressed
5
 
firms’ theory, loss-making firms may extend more credit to improve sales and keep 
themselves afloat (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Summers and Wilson, 2002).  Thus, one 
would expect such firms to grant more credit and hence have higher levels of AR. In 
addition, Delannay and Weill (2004) and Soufani and Poutziouris, (2002) find that 
certain loss-making firms, by default, tend to exhibit high AR resulting from customers 
taking advantage of this financial fragility to delay payment. Therefore, we anticipate 
that both higher profitability and higher distress lead to higher AR. We thus propose the 
following hypothesis:   
H3: Operating profitability has a smile effect on AR.  Specifically, firms with 
greater access to internal financing (higher operating profitability) invest in 
higher levels of AR, while firms in greater distress (negative operating 
profitability) also invest in higher levels of AR.  
Several measures have been used to proxy internal financing represented by the cash 
flow generated from operating profit. Petersen and Rajan (1997), for instance, use net 
profit after tax over turnover while Rodriguez (2006) utilises the operating profit to 
turnover. In this study, we use the latter. 
 2.4. Sales Revenue Growth  
                                                
5
 A firm is defined as being under distress if it has negative sales growth and negative net income (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
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Given that most transactions are on credit, increases in sales lead to increases in the AR 
level. Thus, firms with sales growth may offer more credit to their customers and hence 
invest more in AR (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Wilson, 2008). It is argued that 
small/new firms with potential for growth tend to have larger investments in AR, 
relative to their total assets, as they are inclined to grant more credit to encourage 
repeated business to finance further growth (Summers and Wilson, 2002; Boden and 
Paul, 2014). Nevertheless, those with declining sales may have greater AR as they use 
trade credit as a marketing tool to improve their sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Wilson, 2008). Many find a positive relationship between sales growth and AR in 
expanding firms, which decide to implement aggressive commercial strategies to 
increase sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002). In addition, 
distressed firms extend more credit to boost depressed sales in a bid to survive 
(Delannay and Weill, 2004). A non-linear link between growth and AR is therefore 
expected. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H4: Sales growth has a smile effect on the level of AR, namely, both small 
(negative) and big growth in sales lead to higher levels of AR.  
2.5. Collateral to Secure Financing  
Hammes (2003) and Levchuk (2013) posit that higher value asset based firms can offer 
better collateral to obtain external funding that can then be used to invest in more AR 
by granting credit to customers constrained by inadequacy of collateral. They use the 
net fixed assets to total assets ratio to represents firms’ ability to secure bank loans and 
find that firms with high ratios have a greater ability to secure short-term borrowing to 
invest in AR. Their results are in line with research that finds that when firms have 
relatively easy access to funds through their collateral, they tend to have high levels of 
AR (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Levchuk (2013) uses firms’ net fixed assets to total 
assets ratio as a proxy to measure their ability to secure financing. We therefore expect 
collateral to be positively related to the level of AR, hence:  
H5: Firms with higher net fixed assets to total assets are more likely to grant 
credit and thus to invest in higher levels of AR.  
2.6. Liquidity  
Firms with healthy liquidity tend to invest more in AR (Summers and Wilson, 2002; 
Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Delannay and Weill, 2004; and Paul et al. 2012). They 
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are more willing to finance their customers’ inventory to secure repeat business (Paul 
and Boden, 2008; Paul, 2010). Thus, those with greater liquidity tend to invest in their 
less liquid customers by granting them credit. Nevertheless, Marotta (2000) and 
Rodriguez (2006) argue that firms with a high quick ratio (liquid assets over current 
liabilities) may have less incentive to promote sales through granting credit due to 
potential overtrading and, thus, are likely to offer less credit. However, Levchuk (2013) 
finds that those with financial disadvantages promote sales through investment in low-
return financial instruments such as AR. The liquidity position of firms is proxied by 
the quick ratio, net of commercial components (Levchuk, 2013; Marotta, 2000) and so a 
positive relati nship is expected between liquidity and the level of AR, hence:  
H6: Cash-rich firms invest in higher levels of AR.  
2.7. Price Discrimination  
Firms with high gross profit margins have a greater incentive to finance sales of 
additional units via generous credit terms and hence are expected to have a high level of 
AR (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). They can use different credit terms to price 
discriminate between their customers (Meltzer, 1960; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978; 
Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). For instance, they may choose not to 
enforce the agreed terms and thus allow selected customers to pay after the due date; 
this is the equivalent of a price reduction (Schwartz, 1974; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 
1978; Paul and Boden, 2008). Such generous credit terms allow suppliers 
surreptitiously to violate price regulation (Emery, 1984). In addition, those with healthy 
profit margins can, effectively, afford to reduce the product price through generous 
credit terms and this often leads to additional sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani 
and Poutziouris, 2002). We therefore predict a positive relationship between the level of 
AR and firms’ gross profit margins, hence:  
H7: Firms with higher gross margins are expected to have higher levels AR.  
3. DATA, METHOD AND VARIABLES  
Secondary data is used to test the hypotheses developed in the preceding sectio . We 
use the firms listed on the Main and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia (under the 
Consumer Products and Industrial Products sector), collectively representing all listed 
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manufacturing firms in Malaysia. The data is obtained from Reuter’s official website
6
 
using balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for the financial years ending 2007 to 
2011 (inclusive). This data is then complemented by annual reports, obtained from the 
Bursa Malaysia official website.
7
 We follow Petersen and Rajan’s (1997) study and 
adopt a correlational approach to examine the factors that affect the level of AR. A 
predictive correlational design is used to explore causality and factors influencing other 
variables. 
 We use AR as a proxy for the granting of trade credit. However, because of potential 
scale effect problems, we also consider a scaled version of AR, namely AR to totals 
assets (AR/TA). We increase the scale of this variable in order to match the scale of the 
dependent variables (which helps reduce the number of decimal places in the estimated 
coefficients, but does not alter the results). Thus, our second dependent variable is 
defined as follows: 
ARTA =

	
		
× 1000 
 
In line with our hypotheses, we use seven independent variables, which have been 
identified in previous studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; 
Delannay and Weill, 2004): company size, access to internal/external financing, 
operating profit, sales revenue growth, price discrimination, liquidity and collateral.  
Finally, to complete our model specification, we consider several control variables. The 
first is a dummy representing the firm’s sector. This variable represents either consumer 
product or industrial product manufacturers (in accordance with Bursa Malaysia’s 
classification). Prior studies, such as those of Angappan and Nasruddin (2003) and 
Nasruddin (2008), included the sector as a control variable. SECTOR is used to control 
for the well-known impact of industry sectors and payment customs (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Angappan and Nasruddin, 2003; Nasruddin, 2008). Consumer products 
are more fast-moving than industrial products and mainly for consumption whereas 
industrial products are mainly for capital goods. As a result, commercial motives, 
elasticity of demand, and economies of scale are expected to be different in different 
sectors. Following the Bursa Malaysia classification for the manufacturing sector, the 
                                                
6
 www.reuters.com/finance 
7
 www.bursamalysia.com 
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variable SECTOR is set equal to zero for consumer products and one for industrial 
products. Other sectors are not included in this study.  
The second control variable is the auditor’s reputation (AUDITOR), which identifies 
whether the firm uses one of the Big Four auditing firms in Malaysia. Large firms are 
expected to have better resources and technical expertise and may be more likely to use 
auditors of the highest reputation (Eng and Mak, 2003; Janssen et al., 2005; Gul et al., 
2009). Therefore, we use AUDITOR to control for the possibility that firms audited by 
one of the Big Four extend different levels of trade compared to those that use the 
services of firms other than the Big Four. The variable AUDITOR is a dummy, which is 
set equal to one if the firm is audited by one of the Big Four and zero otherwise.  
The third variable captures the possible effect of a high family ownership concentration 
(set at 20% or more family ownership). Malaysia has a high level of family ownership 
concentration (Claessens, et al., 2000; Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012) and per capita has 
one of the highest presences of family-owned firms in the world (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012; Sinnadurai, 2015). Family owned-firms are more likely to 
enjoy enhanced earnings quality (Wang, 2006; Ali et al., 2007) and may, therefore, 
obtain high levels of AR by granting more credit to their customers. The control for 
family ownership captures ownership concentration as a potential determinant of credit 
granting in the same way as dividend policy (La Porta et al., 2000; Aivazian et al., 
2003; Mitton, 2004). We label this dummy variable OWN, and we set it equal to one if 
20% or more of the firm’s equity is family owned and zero otherwise. 
Finally, the time effect is accounted for by four time dummies (T2007 to T2010), where 
each dummy-year is set equal to one for that particular year and zero otherwise. These 
four years are contrasted with the year 2006.  
Since the data set consists of observations for 262 firms over five consecutive years, the 
evaluation should be undertaken within a panel analysis framework. The reason for this 
is that our data involves two dimensions and panel regression has a greater capacity to 
model the complex behaviour of firms compared with a simple cross-section or time 
series regression. Indeed, panel data regression provides a more accurate inference of 
estimated parameters, and exploits the additional degrees of freedom and sample 
variability better than the single cross-section or time series models (Hsiao et al., 1995). 
Another advantage of a panel regression over a simple cross-section regression is that it 
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provides greater flexibility when modelling differences in behaviour across different 
firms. These firm-specific effects are accounted for in a natural way in panel data 
models. However, one particular difficulty is whether these effects should be treated as 
fixed or randomly distributed across firms. The fixed effects model assumes that the 
unobserved firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, while in the latter 
case they may be correlated. Fortunately, the choice between the fixed or random 
effects model may be tested empirically through the Hausman (1978) test, which 
assesses whether the firm-specific factors are correlated with the regressors. Rejection 
of this hypothesis implies that the firm-specific factors should be treated as fixed 
(deterministic) rather than random. Table 1 provides brief definitions of the above 
independent variables and relates them to the study’s hypotheses. 
4. RESULTS 
Our data consists of 262 firms over a period of five years (2007-2011). Although a 
pooled time series and cross section regression is possible, the potential heterogeneity 
across firms may bias the results. Both fixed effect and random effect approaches are 
therefore adopted.  The following linear equation is proposed: 
  =  +  +  ! + "##$ + %##$
  
																																													+&'( + )'(
 + * + +,-! 
																																													+./0 + 1 + -! +  '0 + "2007 
																																													+%2008 + &2009 + )2010 
 
where  takes one of the two AR proxies defined earlier, for firm i in year t, and  
is a firm specific effect, which is assumed either fixed or random depending on the 
panel data model adopted. 
Table 1. List of Independent and Control Variables 
Hypothesis Explanatory Variables  Definition  
H1 Company’s size (LOGSIZE)  Log (Book Value of Assets)  
H2 Short-term line of credit 
(STCREDIT)  
Financial Institutions Debts in Current 
Liabilities/Turnover  
H3 Profit and internal cash 
(OPEPROFIT)  
Operating Profit Before Tax (OP) /Revenue(REV)  
H4 Sales growth (SGROWTH)  Percentage Sales Growth  
H5 Collateral to secure 
financing (COLLATERAL)  
Net Fixed Assets /Total Assets  
H6 Liquidity (LIQUID)  Quick Ratio, i.e. the ratio of current assets 
(excluding inventories) over current liabilities  
H7 Gross Margin (GMARGIN)  Gross Profit Margin/Revenue 
Control 
Industry Sector (SECTOR)  Industrial Products = ‘1’, Consumer = zero 
Auditors (AUDITOR) Big Four audit firms = ‘1’, zero otherwise. 
Ownership (OWN)  Family members own 20% or more of 
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 shareholdings of company = ‘1’, zero otherwise.  
Of the 262 publicly listed firms under study, 66% are in industrial products while the 
remainder specialise in consumer products. Over half the sample (51.14%) employs one 
of the Big Four auditing firms in Malaysia. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables used in 
the analysis. The statistics are summarised across all firm-year observations. A typical 
Malaysian firm has an average AR of just over 66 million RM. The large standard 
deviation of nearly 114 million RM is indicative of large dispersion of credit granting in 
our sample. The most credit offered is just over 1.25 billion RM. This extreme figure 
indicates the scale of the potential problem stemming from the heterogeneity in firm 
size across the sample. Once we scale AR by total assets, the figures look more 
reasonable with an average of 16.33% and a maximum of 63.19%. 
Additional calculations reveal that the firms making industrial products have longer 
days outstanding (81.64 days) compared to consumer product manufacturers (65.29 
days). This is confirmed by the figures on ARTA (16.92% for the industry against 
15.18% for the non-industry). However, in absolute terms, the AR of the two sectors are 
of similar scale (67.84 million RM against 62.73 million RM) though the industry 
sector is marginally higher. These results are in line with those of Angappan and 
Nasruddin (2003), who find that industrial product manufacturers have higher levels of 
AR compared with consumer product manufacturers. 
The remaining independent variables also show large variability and extreme cases. The 
short-term credit also reflects a substantial diversity within our sample. The average 
availability of debt (current liabilities) relative to turnover is 0.249%. Given a standard 
deviation of 0.464, which would mean that approximately 95% of firms have credit 
availability of less than 1.2%, this indicates that the majority of firms have little access 
to external funding. Nevertheless, there are a few firms that have much healthier access 
to credit (the maximum being 5.856%).  
The operating profit is negative on average. This is not surprising since our sample 
coincides with the global meltdown of the credit crunch. The growth in sales is about 
11% on average, but includes extremes on both sides. While some firms’ growth 
declined by nearly 94%, that of others exploded by more than 2,254%. The collateral 
also shows a substantial diversity in our sample. Although the average is around 3% 
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(with more than 90% of the firms having less than 9% collateral) there are some outliers 
with 46.349%. The liquidity is very similar. Finally, the gross margin shows a positive 
average profitability of nearly 18%, but a substantial number of firms witnessed losses 
(the standard deviation suggesting that about 95% of firms had gross margins between 
roughly -10% and 46%). 
Pearson’s pairwise correlation matrix is shown in Table 3. As can be seen, the largest 
correlation is between gross margin and operating profit. Although significant at the 1% 
level, the correlation is well below the usual recommended threshold of 0.8 (Gujarati, 
2006). The lowest correlation is -0.358 between short-term credit and operating profit. 
Overall, the pairwise correlations between the independent variables do not suggest that 
multicollinearity is an issue. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of the Main Dependent and Independent Variables 
Series  Mean  Std. Error  Minimum  Maximum  
AR (million RM)  66.107  113.996  0.000  1254.185  
ARTA (%)  16.329  9.831  0.000  63.189  
LOGSIZE (log Million RM)  5.483  1.177  3.131  10.171  
STCREDIT (%)  0.249  0.464  0.000  5.856  
OPEPROFIT (million RM)  -0.376  41.465  -873.564  270.306  
SGROWTH (%)  11.058  84.887  -93.987  2254.707  
COLLATERAL (%)  3.057  3.241  0.000  41.989  
LIQUID (%)  2.635  2.987  0.105  46.349  
GMARGIN (%)  17.912  13.977  -71.227  86.280  
 
Table 3. Pairwise Correlations of the Main Independent Variables 
 LOGSIZE  STCREDIT  OPEPROFIT  SGROWTH  COLLATERAL  LIQUID 
CREDIT -0.037   
   
OPERPROFIT 0.143** -0.358**   
  
SGROWTH 0.049 -0.070* 0.091**   
 
COLLATERAL 0.080** -0.174** 0.104** 0.068*   
LIQUID -0.087** -0.240** 0.100** -0.034 -0.023  
GMARGIN 0.113** -0.168** 0.378** 0.060 -0.008 0.103** 
                   ** significant at the 1% level. * significant at the 5% level. 
Table 4 presents the results for the random and fixed effect models for the two 
dependent variables. In both cases, the Hausman specification test is highly significant 
and suggests that the fixed effect models are more appropriate. The coefficients for the 
sector (SEC) and ownership (OWN) dummies are not estimated under the fixed 
specification since the fixed effect model wipes out time invariant variables (including 
the intercept). We will therefore rely on the random effect estimates of these dummy 
variables, while for the remaining coefficients we will use the fixed effect estimates. 
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The two fixed effect models explain a significant portion of the variability of the trade 
credit measures. The R-squares are 86.9% and 84.6% for AR and ARTA respectively, 
whereas both F-statistics are highly significant, suggesting that the overall fit is 
statistically significant. However, the relative (ARTA) and absolute (AR) measures of 
trade credit do not coincide. The level of AR is explained almost exclusively by size. In 
the AR model, the coefficient associated with LOGSIZE is highly significant and 
positive, suggesting that larger firms grant more trade credit, and hence have high levels 
of AR. This result could have two explanations. One obvious, but less likely, 
explanation is that only size matters for credit granting. If we were to accept this 
explanation, then only the first hypothesis can be confirmed. However, a more rational 
explanation is that these results are likely to be due to the scale effect. In other words, 
the results are driven by the fact that some firms are larger than others. Since larger 
firms have relatively larger sales, AR are naturally greater for larger firms. This effect 
could be so important that the other explanations such as collateral or liquidity are 
dwarfed and rendered statistically insignificant. This suggests that AR is not an 
appropriate measure for trade credit since the scale effect dominates and obscures other 
variables. The only other significant variable for the AR model is sales growth.  
The model for the relative measure, ARTA, shows a more realistic outcome, albeit with 
a marginally lower coefficient of determination. It is clear that size does not dominate 
the other variables. More importantly, size (H1) has a negative effect on credit granting 
(larger firms extend less credit relative to their size). The coefficient of log-size is -
14.36, and suggests that an increase from the average firm size of 244 million RM (5.48 
log-million RM) to 665 million RM (6.46 log-million RM) reduces the granting of 
credit by slightly more than 14%. This is contrary to the prediction of our first 
hypothesis. 
Short-term credit (H2) is highly significant and suggests that a one percentage point 
increase in short-term external finance leads to a decrease in the level of AR of around 
13%. Sales growth (H4) is modelled with a quadratic term in order to capture non-
linearity. Our fourth hypothesis states that both small (or negative) growth and big 
growth lead to higher levels of AR (smile pattern). This can be captured by the linear 
(SGROWTH) and quadratic (SGROWTH
2
) terms. The smile pattern would be indicated 
by a negative linear coefficient and a positive quadratic coefficient. The results suggest 
the opposite of the smile pattern since the linear term is positive (=0.211) and 
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significant while the quadratic coefficient is negative (=-0.0001) and significant. This 
means that a decrease in sales always decreases the level of AR. At the same time, 
increasing sales always leads to increases in AR levels, albeit at a decreasing rate. 
Collateral (H5) is highly significant and has a positive coefficient, suggesting that a one 
percentage point increase in collateral increases AR by 3.56%.  
The remaining variables, namely operating profit (H3) and liquidity (H6), and gross 
margin (H7) are insignificant.  
The control variables have a mixed effect. The sector, auditor and ownership dummies 
are insignificant (as suggested by the random effect model). The second group of 
control variables are the time dummies related to the crisis period. The 2007 dummy is 
insignificant, meaning that there was no difference in the level of AR between 2006 and 
2007. This is expected as the year 2007 was the beginning the credit crunch whereas 
ARTA is a stock variable that cumulates over one or more years. However, the crisis 
was more clearly felt a year later, starting from 2008. Indeed, the dummies for 2008, 
2009 and 2010 are all highly significant and negative. Thus, the crisis reduced the 
average relative credit granted, probably as a result of financial difficulties, and the 
increased default risk faced by suppliers. 
Table 4. Fixed and Random Effect Panel Data Estimation Results 
 Fixed Effect                  Random Effect  
  AR ARTA AR ARTA 
 coeff p-val coeff p-val Coeff p-val coeff p-val 
Intercept  
 
    -252.802  0.000  274.935  0.000  
         
LOGSIZE  29.782  0.000  -14.360  0.028  59.228  0.000  -21.214  0.000  
STCREDIT  -0.935  0.832  -13.124  0.001  -4.133  0.328  -13.885  0.000  
OPEPROFIT  -0.014  0.833  0.112  0.078  -0.049  0.466  0.113  0.069  
OPEPROFIT2  -0.0001  0.853  0.0001  0.234  0.000  0.493  0.000  0.263  
SGROWTH  0.105  0.013  0.211  0.000  0.089  0.031  0.204  0.000  
SGROWTH2  -0.0001  0.029  -0.0001  0.000  0.000  0.048  0.000  0.000  
COLLATERAL  0.073  0.945  3.562  0.000  0.561  0.534  5.168  0.000  
LIQUID  0.382  0.613  -0.860  0.220  0.362  0.608  -1.538  0.021  
GMARGIN  -0.172  0.468  -0.298  0.175  -0.390  0.065  -0.271  0.183  
SEC     -1.307  0.903  19.570  0.113  
AUDITOR     8.465  0.403  4.694  0.680  
OWN     2.708  0.790  -9.963  0.393  
T2007  -2.254  0.584  0.971  0.800  -4.534  0.264  0.261  0.945  
T2008  -2.136  0.612  -10.289  0.009  -5.712  0.164  -11.271  0.003  
T2009  -7.105  0.097  -19.565  0.000  -11.178  0.007  -20.068  0.000  
T2010  -3.261  0.439  -22.331  0.000  -7.543  0.065  -22.809  0.000  
2 0.869 0.846     
Page 80 of 90Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Accounting in Em
erging Econom
ies19 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the accounts receivable over total revenue reported by the firms extracted from 
www.reuters.com/finance/stocks. 
The coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the reported t-statistics are White-   adjusted values to control 
for heteroscedasticity. 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
One important result in this paper relates to the involvement of size both in the 
definition of, and the impact on, the level of AR. If we define trade credit as the level of 
AR, then size is not only positively related to the level of AR, but also virtually the only 
variable that matters. We argue that this scale effect should be controlled for, since 
large firms naturally grant more credit on average. Controlling for the scale effect 
through the use of ARTA reveals interesting insights. First, contrary to expectations, 
our results show that larger Malaysian manufacturing firms grant less trade credit 
relative to their size. Nevertheless, this result is in line with Soufani and Poutziouris 
(2002) and Delannay and Weill (2004) who argue that under market power theory, 
larger firms have a better bargaining position in the trading relationship and, as such, 
may not need to grant credit to sell their goods. In fact, given their greater bargaining 
power, larger firms are capable of imposing stricter conditions for payments and thus 
may capitalise on their position to reduce the costs associated with holding considerable 
amounts of AR. In addition, Smith (1987) and Paul and Boden (2008) argue that larger 
firms tend to have a good reputation and hence to grant less credit to their customers 
who do not need extended time to inspect the quality of the products. However, as we 
reported in the literature review section, the majority of existing empirical work has 
shown a positive relationship between size and credit granting. Although the result 
could partly be sensitive to methodological issues (we would have confirmed a positive 
relationship under an AR definition), it could also be specific to Malaysia. Malaysian 
manufacturing firms may be more efficient at collecting debt, or may simply have more 
market power compared with their counterparts in the industrialised economies. 
Overall, we find insufficient evidence in our sample of firms to confirm our first 
hypothesis. 
Regression F  24.965 20.686     
p-val (F) 0.000 0.000      
Log Likelihood  -7204.54 -7159.16 
Hausman Test 31.609 35.187 
p-val 0.001 0.000 
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Second, the results show that firms in our sample that have access to short-term finance 
are less likely to grant credit. This suggests that the helping-hand theory does not hold 
as far as the Malaysian manufacturing firms are concerned: firms that have better access 
to short-term finance do not use trade credit to pass on the benefit to their customers. 
Our second hypothesis is therefore rejected. Operating profit is found to play no 
significant role in determining the level of AR. While our third hypothesis predicted a 
smile effect (a negative linear coefficient and a positive quadratic coefficient), the 
results show that the two coefficients are not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level of significance. Thus, we conclude that whether a firm is more or less profitable 
has no consequence on trade credit granting; the third hypothesis is therefore rejected. 
Our fourth hypothesis, suggesting that the change in sales has a smile effect, is also 
rejected. Our results show that when sales increase, the level of AR increases with 
them. On the other hand, when sales decrease, AR decreases with them but at an 
increasing rate. This is clearly contrary to prior findings, which argue that when the 
level of sales decreases, firms use trade credit to increase their sales (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Soufani and Poutziouris, 2002; Delannay, 2004; Wilson, 2008). 
Collateral is positively correlated with the level of AR in Malaysian manufacturing 
firms. It seems to play a significant role in decisions over the AR level, implying that 
those with higher tangibility can collateralise their assets to obtain external financing to 
fund their working capital, inter alia, passing on the benefit to their customers by 
extending them credit through AR. This finding is consistent with Levchuk (2013), 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Boden and Paul (2014). Our fifth hypothesis is, 
therefore, the only one we could confirm for Malaysian manufacturing firms. Finally, 
we found no evidence to support the remaining hypotheses, Liquidity (H6) and gross 
margin (H7) both being statistically insignificant. 
 
 6. CONCLUSION 
Investment in AR is normally impacted by many of the factors implied by either theory 
or empirical evidence. However, our main finding in this paper is that the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector is rather different. First, while in prior studies liquidity and gross 
margin have been found to have a positive and significant effect on the level of AR, our 
results show that these two factors play no role in influencing such level in the 
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Malaysian manufacturing sector. Second, operating profit was expected to have a U-
shaped effect based on prior findings. This, too, is not supported by our results, which 
suggests that operating profit has no role in determining the scale of AR. Third, while 
size, short-term credit and sales growth have been found to be significant, they are 
nevertheless inconsistent with the expected direction of their relationship with trade 
credit. Both size and short-term credit were expected to play a positive role, but were 
found to have a negative effect instead. Note, however, that size does have a positive 
effect on the level of AR, which is an absolute measure of trade credit. However, we 
argue that AR are naturally linked to firm size and should be descaled in order to 
provide a more relevant measure of trade credit. The only variable consistent with prior 
studies is collateral. This factor was found to have a positive effect, as expected. The 
positive association of collateral with the level of AR is the only hypothesis confirmed 
by this study.  
Our results have several pri cipal implications for policy makers. First, we show that 
policy makers should not take a holistic view of the trade credit market. Given that 
policy makers aim to improve liquidity and trade, they should design policies that are 
not only country specific but also sector specific. As is clear from our results, what 
holds for other countries or sectors may not necessarily be true for the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector. For example, if elsewhere size is positively linked to the level of 
investment in accounts receivable, then government policy (via incentive schemes, for 
example) should target smaller firms because they offer less trade credit. On the other 
hand, in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, the policy should be directed towards 
larger firms. 
Second, under the new Expected Credit Loss (ECL) provisioning rule of IFRS 9, 
companies must provide for expected credit losses from the time credit is granted 
(Cohen and Edwards, 2017). This rule has important implications for Malaysian firms 
in the light of our findings. In particular, we found that smaller firms and those with 
lower short-term credit facilities tended to offer more trade credit. Thus, because of 
their reduced size and financial capabilities, these firms are particularly vulnerable to 
credit shocks, and should make provision for potential credit losses rather than wait for 
“trigger events” signalling imminent losses.  
It is disturbing to note that large firms may depend on their bargaining power to the 
detriment of the small and medium sector growth. The Malaysian authorities may 
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consider initiatives adopted in the UK and Europe, for example, to protect this 
important asset that many describe as the riskiest in a firm’s balance sheet due to the 
risk related to late payment and possible default that increases the costs of granting 
credit. In the UK, for instance, many Codes and Charters have been introduced to 
protect companies’ investments in AR (especially those of SMEs). These measures 
include the statutory provision of late payment interest legislation, (charging 8% above 
the bank rate), the change to the Companies Act that requires disclosure of payment 
trends, the Prompt Payment code administered by the Chartered Institute for Credit 
Management on behalf of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(such self-regulatory devices attempting to alter the behaviour of larger customers by 
eliciting public commitments to ethical and fair behaviour). Other measures include 
self-regulation, such as Voluntary Codes of Conduct, and business support in the form 
of enhanced training for SMEs. The UK late payment legislation was subsequently 
adopted by the EU (European Union Directive 2000/35/EC).  
Third, trade credit research is highly sensitive to the definition of trade credit. Results, 
therefore, depend primarily on the proxy the researcher uses for the level of credit 
granted. We find clear evidence that the use of certain definitions of AR is likely to 
distort findings and affect the validity of empirical results. One methodological 
implication of our study is the importance of using relative rather than absolute 
measures of trade credit. These latter give disproportionate importance to size and this 
can obscure the impact of the other factors that normally affect trade credit and thus AR 
levels.  
The absence or negligible impact of the helping hand theory further raises concerns 
about the political economy of the country. It appears that there is a disconnect between 
large and small businesses. Organisations such as SMEs need to harness the potential of 
big businesses to play a benign role in enhancing the ecosystem for the SME sector in 
the same way as in other parts of the world where the helping hand is more widespread, 
as explained earlier. Lastly, the low inclination of firms to use trade credit to boost 
declining sales may need to be investigated. Perhaps the enforcement of IAS 39 (or 
MFRS 139 in Malaysia since 2010) will deter firms from using this technique. Future 
research may examine whether adoption of IFRS9 (or MFRS 9) has had an effect and 
how the new model for expected credit losses will impact investment in AR. 
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On the theoretical side, given that most of our hypotheses have been rejected, some of 
the existing theories on trade credit need to be revised, at least as regards the developing 
world. The behaviour of the firm and its management towards AR is clearly not 
universal. For example, some (Muslim) Malaysian managers may hold certain beliefs 
towards usury and as a result, may not tolerate the explicit or implicit interest embedded 
in investment in AR. In the developed world, larger firms and firms with access to 
financing tend to grant more trade credit. Malaysian firms are not aligned with this 
behaviour. Indeed, the negative relationship between firm size and trade credit suggests 
that market power theory is more relevant in Malaysia. On the other hand, the 
transaction cost argument and the helping hand theory play a less prominent role in 
Malaysia.  
Our quantitative approach has obvious limitations. First, we used a simple linear model, 
which may be a crude approximation to the true AR data generating process. In 
particular, as AR and ARTA are strictly positive, a Panel Tobit model might be 
preferred since it truncates the data at zero. Second, our model tested AR and ARTA in 
levels rather than differences. One way to extend our study is to investigate the 
dynamics in trade credit, which can be measured using the yearly change in AR and 
ARTA. Third, the scope of our findings could be enriched and broadened via a 
qualitative approach using interview data. Although secondary quantitative data allows 
for formal statistical testing, qualitative data has advantages where there may be 
potential issues, behaviours, or technical information not identified in the literature but 
which may be identified during interviews. Certain behaviours, experiences, and 
understandings of firms’ managers cannot be captured by secondary financial data. 
Finally, AR is a stock variable and therefore not a true reflection of trade credit, which 
is a flow variable. Thus, some of this missing information can be obtained, albeit 
partially and imperfectly, from the manager’s direct observation of the flow of trade 
credit during the year. 
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